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I quantify the welfare and environmental gains and losses from a policy establishing
an environmental tax/subsidy for new cars in France in 2008. I estimate a structural
model of demand and supply that features heterogeneity in consumer preferences to go
beyond the average policy effects and analyse distributional aspects. The policy reduces
average carbon emissions by 1.6% at the cost of additional emissions of local pollutants.
The regulation favours middle-income individuals but has redistributive effects when
combined with a tax that is proportional to income. Moreover, local pollutant emissions
increase least in poor and rural areas, suggesting another redistribution channel.
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1 Introduction
Policy evaluation tends to focus on the average or overall impact, often neglecting the
importance of distributional effects. For instance, the long-lasting “yellow vests” protests in
France, which began in October 2018 and destabilised the government, illustrate the crucial
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role of distributional effects for public policy acceptance. The movement started with an
increase in the diesel tax, a measure with a low expected impact on the overall population that
severely penalises suburban and rural households that rely heavily on cars for work and social
activities. Another example is the strong reaction of the Chilean population to a small subway
fare price increase in October 2019 in the capital city Santiago. Understanding a policy’s
distributional effects is especially relevant when it favours some individuals at the expense
of others. This the case with the 2008 French environmental feebate (“bonus/malus”).
This environmental policy introduces a combination of purchase taxes and subsidies for new
cars based on their carbon emission levels (CO2). The purchase of low-emission vehicles is
encouraged through a rebate (“bonus”) that reaches up to e1,000, while the purchase of
high-emission cars is discouraged through a tax (“malus”) up to e2,600.
This paper evaluates the 2008 French feebate policy and analyses its distributional effects.
There are two types of gains and losses for French households from the feebate policy: a direct
effect through the amount spent by individuals and the characteristics of their car purchases
and an indirect effect from the air quality. By targeting CO2 emissions, the feebate policy
favours diesel cars, which, relative to gasoline cars, are associated with higher emissions
of nitrogen oxide (NOX) and particulate matter (PM). These are the most hazardous air
pollutants and directly affect the respiratory system.1 The increase in emissions of these
pollutants caused by the feebate policy is a hidden cost that my policy evaluation takes into
account. NOX, PM and other local pollutants downgrade the air quality near their origin,
so the question of where they are emitted is relevant. This is, however, not the case of
CO2 emissions that generate global pollution. The policy effect on the emissions of local
pollutants is heterogeneous across regions and constitutes another source of redistribution
across individuals, which I quantify.
I use a structural model for the demand and supply of new automobiles to simulate the
market equilibrium (car prices and market shares of the different car models) without the
feebate regulation. My model predicts which car models individuals would have purchased
and their prices, absent of the feebate policy in 2008, allowing me to identify the causal
effect of the feebate regulation from the comparison between the market equilibria with
and without the policy. I specify and estimate a demand model that incorporates a high
level of heterogeneity in preferences for car attributes and price sensitivities. I leverage
granular data on car sales at the local level to identify the heterogeneity parameters: I
exploit the correlation between car purchases’ characteristics and consumers’ demographic
characteristics across municipalities. Standard models fail to characterise the winners and
losers because they do not specify preference heterogeneity as a function of individual
characteristics. In contrast, I link gains or losses from the feebate to households’ demographic
characteristics. On the supply side, I model the pricing strategies of car manufacturers when
they are subject to the feebate regulation and estimate the marginal costs of all the cars
proposed on the market.
Finally, I investigate the performance of the actual feebate scheme in redistributing benefits
across individuals and car manufacturers and limiting the diesel car share and emissions of
1The World Health Organization estimates that ambient air pollution caused 4.2 million premature
deaths worldwide in 2016.
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local pollutants. I measure the potential gains associated with alternative feebate schemes
that reach the same CO2 emissions reduction at the same budget cost as the 2008 feebate
scheme. Among the set of possible feebate schemes that achieve these two objectives, I
identify those that maximise each of the following outcomes: consumer surplus, national
manufacturers’ profits, reduction of emissions of local pollutants and diesel car share reduction.
I consider different weights for each municipality’s outcome in the global objective: weights
that are simply proportional to the population size; weights that are proportional to the
population size and inversely proportional to income; a Rawlsian weighting scheme that
puts all weight on the most disadvantaged municipality and a weighting system that takes
into account only the difference between the best and the worst outcomes. I focus on three
classes of feebate schemes: one that taxes and subsidises equally gasoline and diesel cars and
two that penalise diesel cars (with different levels of penalisation).
The identification of the policy effect relies on the assumption that the feebate has a price
effect. I do not model and estimate any potential side effects that the regulation could
generate. The introduction of taxes and rebates based on CO2 emissions may transmit
some information on how society values the environment. It is also plausible that this new
policy makes environmental friendliness a more salient car characteristic. D’Haultfœuille
et al. (2016) provide evidence of a shift in preferences towards low-emission cars in 2008,
suggesting a potential additional policy effect on top of the pecuniary incentives. Because
there is no direct evidence that the feebate policy is responsible for the shift in preferences
except for the time coincidence, I prefer to focus my analysis on the pure pecuniary incentive
effect of the policy.
I adopt a structural approach rather than a reduced-form approach because most of the
outcomes of interest, such as consumer surplus and car manufacturer profits, are not directly
observable but can be expressed as functions of the model parameters. My model flexibly
represents consumers’ car choice and converts the policy’s impact into monetary terms.
Finally, with such a structural approach, it is possible to quantify the impacts of hypothetical
feebates used to evaluate the performance of the 2008 feebate.
I find that the policy increases annual welfare by e115 to e119 million. This overall
welfare effect balance the consumer surplus, car manufacturer profits with the budget cost of
the policy for the government and the value of emissions generated or avoided. In addition to
CO2, NOX and PM emissions, I account for carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrocarbon (HC)
emissions. I find that the French households overall gain from the policy, but if the policy
cost is financed by taxing them, their overall surplus decreases by e39 million. The budget
cost of the policy reaches e210 million that necessitates an average household tax of e23.9 to
be financed. French car manufacturers considerably benefit from the feebate policy, with an
increase of e158 million in their profits. Average CO2 emissions from car purchases decrease
by 1.6% but overall annual new car emissions increase. Once converted in monetary terms,
the change in annual CO2 emissions generates a loss of e0.49 million. This cost can turn into
a benefit when taking into account that extra new car sales are old car replacements. Lastly,
average emissions of NOX and PM increase, while those of CO and HC decrease. Overall,
the annual cost of local pollutant emissions increases under all assumptions on the origin of
extra new car sales, reducing welfare by e0.015 to e1.31 million.
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Beyond the overall policy effect, I find heterogeneous impacts across households and car
manufacturers. On the consumer side, the distributional consequences depend on the tax
system used to finance the feebate budget cost. Under a uniform tax (identical for all
individuals), the feebate scheme favours middle-income individuals. In contrast, if the
tax is proportional to income, the feebate achieves some redistribution from the richest
to the poorest households. The 2008 feebate performance is high in terms of maximising
consumer surplus, with potential gains below 0.5%. Consumer surplus inequalities could
potentially be further reduced by more than 10%. However, this reduction would come at
the cost of a decrease in total consumer surplus. On the car manufacturer side, the feebate
heavily stimulates French manufacturers at the expense of most German manufacturers
and some Asian and American manufacturers. There is little room to improve French car
manufacturers’ profits; the current feebate scheme achieves more than 99.5% of the maximum
profits obtainable with alternative feebates, depending on the weights assigned to each car
manufacturer and the feebate class.
A side effect of the feebate policy is that it pushes individuals to buy cars that, on
average, emit 0.5% more NOX emissions and 0.3% more PM emissions indicating potential
consequences for local air quality. Emissions increase the most in municipalities where they
are initially the lowest, implying another type of redistribution in favour of high-emissions
municipalities. The municipalities where NOX and PM emissions increase most are rich
and dense municipalities, where the diesel car share is initially moderate. However, these
municipalities are associated with larger decreases in the average emissions of CO and HC,
reflecting the trade-off between pollutants. The municipalities where emissions increase
most are also those where pollution is typically a critical issue. I find that NOX emissions
increase most in municipalities where nitrogen dioxides in the ambient air are the highest.
My assessment of the feebate performance indicates that local pollutants’ rise could be lower
under alternative feebate schemes. I find that moderate increases in NOX and PM emissions
are possible, especially with diesel-penalizing feebates. However, this comes at the cost of
higher CO and HC emissions, indicating that it is impossible to improve emissions rates for
all pollutants simultaneously.
This paper complements two other studies on the effects of the French feebate policy. The
first study, by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2014), quantifies the short- and long-term impacts of
the feebate on CO2 emissions. A second study, by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2016), disentangles
the sources of CO2 emissions reduction in the automobile market over the period 2003-2008
and quantifies the role of the feebate policy. These two papers focus on aggregate outcomes
only and do not consider the heterogeneity in the feebate’s impacts or its distributional
consequences. Nor they do consider its collateral effects on the emissions of local air
pollutants. The two papers estimate the full policy impact, including its side effect, while my
analysis is bounded to the pecuniary effect of the policy. D’Haultfœuille et al. (2016) rely, as I
do here, on a structural model of demand and supply to describe the car market. In contrast,
D’Haultfœuille et al. (2014) identify the feebate’s effects on car market shares directly,
without relying on an equilibrium model for the automobile market. The identification
strategy relies on comparing market shares between 2007 and 2008, controlling for differences
in observables. The paper by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2014) also investigates the feebate’s
effect on total CO2 emissions through the car replacement rate and car production, which
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my analysis neglects. However, the authors cannot balance the environmental policy effects
with local pollution and the welfare gains and losses from households and car manufacturers,
which I can do.
Other related papers evaluate the impacts of hypothetical and actual environmental policies
on the automobile market using structural models. Goldberg (1998) is the first to model and
analyse the effects of fuel economy standards in the U.S. Huse (2012) examines the effect
of an asymmetric regulation in the Swedish car market: the “green car rebate”, which is
awarded under different standards depending on whether the car uses fossil fuel or renewable
energy. Adamou et al. (2014) evaluate the welfare effects of a hypothetical feebate policy
in the German automobile market. Durrmeyer and Samano (2018) compare the efficiency
of hypothetical feebate-type policies with fuel economy standards. These studies focus on
aggregate effects and do not investigate the distributional consequences of the regulations or
their impacts on air quality.
The externalities of CO2-based regulation on local pollution have been theoretically investigated
by Ambec and Coria (2013) and empirically by Linn (2019). The latter compares the effects
of hypothetical fuel taxes and vehicle taxes on the level of NOX. He does not rely on the
level of car NOX emissions as I do here, and the only heterogeneity in NOX emissions comes
from the fuel type in his model.
The first papers studying the distributional consequences of automobile market regulations
focus on gas and carbon taxes. Bento et al. (2009) study the distributional effects of an
increase in the gas tax using a model that represents car purchases and car usage, while
West (2004) investigates alternative regulations to gas taxes such as vehicle subsidies. A few
papers evaluate whether other types of environmental regulations on the automobile market
are progressive or regressive. For instance, Jacobsen (2013) estimates the welfare effects of an
increase in fuel economy standards by income class. My paper is close to three recent articles
that focus on the distributional aspects of different environmental regulations. Davis and
Knittel (2019) quantify the distributional effects of fuel economy standards in the U.S. and
find that the standards are mildly progressive. Their study differs from mine since they do not
rely on an equilibrium model for the car market. Instead, they calculate the implicit subsidy
or tax implied by the standard for all cars purchased and use this to measure consumers’
gains or losses. Holland et al. (2019) investigate the distributional effects of the introduction
of electric vehicles and the consequences of the displacement of emissions from the road to
power plants. Finally, Levinson (2019) provides theoretical and empirical evidence that fuel
economy standards are more regressive than fuel taxes using household transportation survey
data. This study, like Davis and Knittel (2019), does not use a demand and supply model
and assumes that agents do not reoptimise their vehicle choice under different tax schemes.
Several recent papers quantify the distributional effects of environmental regulation in
contexts other than the automobile market: Bento et al. (2015) use a hedonic regression
approach on housing prices to study the distribution of gains and costs related to the
Clean Air Act Amendments; Borenstein and Davis (2016) evaluate the effects of tax credits
on clean energy in the U.S.; Reguant (2019) analyses the distributional consequences of
alternative subsidy schemes for renewable electricity generation; Feger et al. (2020) focus
on the distribution of the gains and losses associated with subsidies for solar panels in
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Switzerland.
This paper evaluates the performance of the 2008 feebate setup by comparing its outcomes
to those of optimal schemes associated with given objective functions and outcomes. This
study contributes to the literature on optimal environmental regulation in line with the
recent papers by Holland et al. (2016) and Allcott and Kessler (2019). The former computes
the optimal electric vehicle purchase taxes or subsidies when they can be geographically
differentiated. The latter paper derives the optimal targeting of individuals in an energy
conservation information programme.
From a methodological point of view, this paper uses a combination of aggregate and
individual data to estimate demand and supply. Unlike Berry et al. (2004) and Petrin
(2002), I do not observe individual car purchases with direct links between individual choices
and demographic characteristics. Instead, I exploit the correlation between the average
characteristics of cars purchased and the average demographic characteristics of the local
municipality. The way I use local-level data, and the estimation method closely follow
Nurski and Verboven (2016).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the feebate
policy, describes the data and provides some descriptive evidence. In Section 3, I describe the
structural model of the market equilibrium and the estimation method. Section 4 presents
the model specification and the estimation results. In Section 5, I analyse the aggregate
and distributional effects of the feebate policy and evaluate the performance of the feebate
scheme. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional details and data
2.1 The feebate policy
The environmental feebate policy was announced at the end of November 2007 and was
applied on January 1st, 2008. This policy was one of several measures taken by the government
following the Grenelle Environnement roundtables addressing environmental issues. The
main objective of this policy was to reduce CO2 emissions related to automobiles. The policy
was announced as permanent and was supposed to be neutral for the state budget. Its actual
cost reached e294 million in 2008 and e626 million in 2009, according to the official figures
provided in the report of the CGDD (2013), the former French ministry of ecology. The report
notes that two factors were not well accounted for in the model prediction: an increase in
fuel prices and the high popularity of low-emission cars. The feebate scheme includes rebates
and taxes associated with nine classes of CO2 emissions (see Table 1 below). The amounts of
the rebates and taxes were supposed to remain constant, whereas the thresholds were to be
reduced by five grams per kilometre (g/km hereafter) each year from 2010 onwards to take
into account technical progress. I focus only on the feebate effects for the year 2008 because
car manufacturers were not able to react to the policy by modifying their car characteristics
and car assortment between November 2007 and 2008 but rather reacted to the policy by
changing their car prices, a change that is possible to credibly model. The quantification of
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the welfare effects after 2008 is more challenging since it requires a model with endogenous
product characteristics (see Klier and Linn, 2012).
As Table 1 shows, the amounts of the rebates and fees represent a non-negligible percentage
of the purchase prices and reach 8% of the gross price for class A. They are also rather
heterogeneous across classes, indicating that the feebate scheme affected the market equilibrium
in a non-symmetric way.
Table 1: Feebate scheme in 2008
Class of Emissions Feebate Percentage of
emissions (in g/km) (in e) 2007 prices
A (60-100] -1,000 8.0%
B (100-120] -700 4.6%
C+ (120-130] -200 1.1%
C- (130-140] 0 0.0%
D (140-160] 0 0.0%
E+ (160-165] +200 -0.93%
E- (165-200] +750 -3.1%
F (200-250] +1,600 -4.2%
G > 250 +2,600 -5.2%
Note: the feebate is positive for a fee and negative for a rebate.
2.2 Data
In this analysis, I combine two main datasets. The first one was obtained from the French
Syndicate of Car Manufacturers (“Comité des Constructeurs Français d’Automobiles”, CCFA)
and contains information about new car characteristics and sales from 2003 to 2008 at the
municipality level. This database is constructed from the records of all registrations of new
cars purchased by French households. I observe the main car characteristics (horsepower,
weight, cylinder, type of fuel, and body style), including the level of CO2 emissions (from
driving cycle tests) and the catalogue price. The level of CO2 emissions from tests is likely to
underestimate true CO2 emissions, as pointed out by Reynaert and Sallee (2021). However,
this is not problematic for estimates of the changes in CO2 emissions in percentage terms as
long as the bias reflects a constant factor proportional to the true emissions and is uniform
across cars and car manufacturers, an assumption adopted by Reynaert and Sallee (2021).
I constructed the second dataset that contains the demographic characteristics of the
households for 31,588 of the 36,569 municipalities in France; these data were obtained from
several publicly available datasets provided by the French National Survey Institute (see
INSEE).2 The dataset combines information on the median income level and the number of
households for each year between 2003 and 2008 with data from the 2008 census on household
size and socio-professional activities.
2Some municipalities are dropped from my sample because some of their statistics are missing; these are
very small municipalities. Note that the three largest cities (Paris, Marseille and Lyon) are split into smaller
units, “arrondissement”.
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2.3 Assumptions on emissions
Emissions of local pollutants. Because the CCFA data do not provide information on
emissions of local pollutants for each car model, I estimate these emissions from observable
car characteristics using a reduced-form equation. To do so, I rely on two datasets from
the French Energy Agency (ADEME) and the UK Vehicle Certification Agency that provide
information on the emissions levels of all car models. Details on the data, the reduced-form
model and the results are provided in Appendix A. I find that the predicted emissions are
in line with the observed emissions for 2008 in the UK data. NOX and PM are much higher
for diesel engines than for gasoline engines. In contrast, emissions of CO and HC are lower
for diesel engines than for gasoline engines. This pattern is consistent with differences in the
emissions technology of the different engines and the observed emissions in the ADEME and
UK data.3 I also estimate the same reduced-form equation for CO2 emissions and use the
comparison between the observed and predicted values to test the external validity of the
prediction model. I find a high correlation coefficient of 0.88 between true CO2 emissions
and predicted emissions across car models, indicating that the prediction model is able to
capture the heterogeneity in emissions of different car models.
To understand how the feebate, which is based on CO2 emissions, may affect the emissions
of other pollutants, I analyse the correlations between the different pollutants (see Table 12
in Appendix A.2). CO2 emissions are positively correlated with those of CO (0.17) and
HC (0.26) and negatively correlated with those of NOX (-0.23) and PM (-0.18). The high
negative correlations between CO2 and NOX and PM emissions are, however, almost entirely
driven by the differences between diesel and gasoline cars since the correlation between CO2
and NOX becomes positive within fuel types, while the within-fuel-type correlation between
CO2 and PM is almost zero. The effect of the feebate on NOX and PM emissions, therefore,
depends crucially on whether individuals mostly substitute towards lower CO2-emitting cars
within the same fuel type or switch fuels.
The demand model includes an outside option, which is the choice not to buy a new car.
Since the feebate policy is likely to modify the fraction of households choosing the outside
option, it is important to estimate the level of emissions generated by the outside option. The
main assumptions and the estimates are presented in Appendix A.3. Because the outside
option includes a fraction of non-drivers, the emissions from the outside option are lower
than those of an average new car in 2008 for CO2 and NOX. This is not the case for PM, CO
and HC. The emissions from the outside option are 60% higher than those from new cars
in 2008. This indicates that, by stimulating sales and replacement of old, polluting vehicles
with new vehicles associated with low emissions levels, the feebate is likely to affect total
emission non-uniformly across pollutants.
Cost of emissions. To perform a cost-benefit analysis of the feebate regulation, I need
estimates of the social costs of CO2 emissions and air pollutant emissions. For CO2 emissions,
3The exception is PM, for which I predict higher emissions for diesel than gasoline cars in 2008, whereas,
in 2012-2015, the average PM emissions are higher for gasoline than diesel cars. This ranking difference is
explained by a change in emissions standards between the two periods. Indeed, between Euro 4 and Euro 5
standards, diesel cars’ maximum PM emissions level was divided by five.
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I use the uniform value of e40 per ton, which is close to the value estimated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.4 It also corresponds to the lowest value suggested by the
European Commission (see the report of the DG MOVE, 2014). For the cost of air pollution,
I include only the damage cost estimates for NOX, PM and HC, following the literature (there
is not enough evidence of a causal direct adverse effect of CO on health); I use the estimates
for France provided in the report of the DG MOVE (2014) which are displayed in the first
row of Table 16 in Appendix C. The air pollution cost of PM depends on the density of the
municipality: it costs almost twice as much in suburban areas as in rural areas and more
than six times more in urban areas.
The annual car emissions are computed assuming gasoline cars are driven 10,000 kilometres,
while diesel cars are driven 17,000 kilometres.5 Combined with the pollution cost estimates,
I estimate the annual average local air pollution cost per car to be e38 in 2008, and the
average annual carbon cost of a car to be e95. For a diesel car, the average local pollution
cost is between e50 (in rural areas) and e77 (in urban areas), and the CO2 cost is e111.
In contrast, the average local pollution cost for a gasoline car is between e5 and e9, and
its CO2 emissions cost is e74. The difference between diesel and gasoline comes from two
factors. First, diesel cars are assumed to be driven 7,000 more kilometres, mechanically
inflating the annual emissions and their costs. Second, diesel cars emit more NOX and PM,
the costliest pollutants.
An emissions increase may be more costly in areas where emissions are initially high than in
areas where they are low. To approximate such heterogeneity in emissions costs, I estimate
an emission cost for each pollutant and municipality based on the pollution levels of the
municipality. More precisely, I suppose a municipality emissions cost is a simple function
of the emissions level of the municipality and calibrate this function such that the average
national emissions cost is equal to the uniform value suggested by the report of the DG MOVE
(2014). I consider four different functions: linear, quadratic, discontinuous-uniform and
discontinuous-linear. For the discontinuous functions, the cost is null for emissions below the
median emissions level and uniform or linear above this median level. I consider three proxies
for the initial emissions levels of the municipalities. The first is the municipality’s average
new car emissions in 2008 in the absence of the feebate. The second proxy is local estimates of
annual average air emissions concentrations. I rely on emissions concentrations of nitrogen
dioxide (NO2), atmospheric particles with a diameter of 10 micrometres or less (PM10)
and benzene (as a proxy for HC) estimated using data from air pollution measurement
stations in France. The data (from ATMO and EEA), model and results for the prediction
of the air emissions concentrations are presented in Appendix B. The third proxy is simply
the population density, measured by the number of households divided by the municipality
surface area, reflecting that pollution constitutes a critical issue in the most densely populated
areas.6 I provide the details on the calibration and statistics about the distribution of
estimated costs across municipalities in Appendix C.
4See https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html, last
accessed: 1 July 2021.
5These figures represent the average kilometres driven by diesel and gasoline cars in France in 2007 (see
D’Haultfœuille et al., 2014).
6See Opendatasoft for the municipality surface area data.
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2.4 Descriptive evidence
I correlate car purchase characteristics with demographic characteristics across French municipalities
through descriptive regressions. The estimated parameters provide information about correlations
and are not interpreted as causal effects. I regress the average car price (gross of feebate in
2008), rebate, diesel car share, CO2 emissions and emissions of local pollutants on income,
income squared, the share of households according to different sizes within the municipality,
the share of households reporting different professional activities within the municipality, and
municipality size (rural, with less than 20,000 inhabitants; urban, with between 20,000 and
200,000 inhabitants; and very urban, with more than 200,000 inhabitants). I also include year
interacted with the county (“departement”) fixed effects to flexibly control for the general
evolution of car purchases over time.7 The percentage of households in each category is
multiplied by 10, so the parameters are interpreted as the effects of a 10% increase in the
percentage of households in the category.
Heterogeneity of purchases. The first three columns of Table 2 show that the demographic
characteristics are significantly correlated with the average price, the average rebate and
the fuel type of the cars purchased. Not surprisingly, I observe that higher incomes and
high socio-professional categories (entrepreneurs and executives) are associated with higher
prices, lower rebates and lower shares of diesel cars. Individuals living in rural areas tend to
buy more diesel cars and receive more rebates, but they also tend to spend more. Finally,
cars are slightly cheaper in 2005-2007 than in 2003, while the average price paid decreases
considerably in 2008 (-e1,720). This price change in 2008 may be the consequence of both
demand and supply effects. Consumers likely choose more fuel-efficient cars to obtain rebates,
which are also cheaper cars. On the supply side, car manufacturers probably decrease the
gross prices of polluting vehicles in response to the feebate. Finally, there is an increasing
trend in the diesel car share, with a structural break in 2008 (+5.5% in 2008 versus an average
trend of 2.1% over 2003-2007). In addition to providing evidence on the heterogeneity
of purchase patterns, the significant correlations support the identification strategy for
the heterogeneity parameters, which leverages the covariance between the demographic
characteristics and the car purchase characteristics across municipalities.
Heterogeneity of emissions. The correlations between the average emissions of cars
purchased and the demographic characteristics across municipalities reveal interesting patterns.
First, the patterns for NOX and PM emissions are closely related and share many similarities
with the correlations between demographics and the share of diesel cars. Second, the signs of
the correlations between demographic characteristics and HC and CO emissions are identical
most of the time and are in line with the correlations between demographic characteristics
and CO2 emissions. This is not surprising given the positive correlation between CO2 and
CO and HC emissions. These results suggest that it is crucial to know whether car buyers are
willing to switch fuel to take advantage of rebates and avoid taxes to determine the feebate’s
impact on local pollutant emissions. High incomes and urban areas are associated with
7The county unit is the second smallest level of aggregation after the municipality, with 96 different
counties in mainland France.
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high CO2, CO and HC emissions but low NOX and PM emissions. High socio-professional
categories tend to buy cars with high CO2, NOX and PM emissions. There is a negative time
trend for CO2 emissions, with notable reductions in 2006 and 2008 (this is consistent with
the findings of D’Haultfœuille et al., 2016, who analyse the different sources of the decrease
in CO2 emissions from 2003-2008 and observe a sharp reduction in average CO2 emissions
in 2006 as a reaction to the introduction of car energy labels). The time trends in emissions
of local pollutants are heterogeneous across pollutants. Average NOX emissions increase
between 2007 and 2008, suggesting an effect of the feebate policy. PM emissions decrease
between 2007 and 2008 but by much less than the annual decrease between 2004 and 2007,
indicating a possible feebate impact. In contrast, CO and HC emissions consistently decrease
between 2003 and 2008, with more significant declines in 2008 than in the previous years.
All these correlations indicate that the year of the feebate introduction is peculiar, revealing
that the feebate probably affects all emissions.
Reaction of car manufacturers. To obtain a sense of whether and how car manufacturers
have reacted to the feebate regulation instituted in 2008, I first provide a simple regression
of the net prices on the amount of the rebate/fee and use the car characteristics, car models
and year fixed effects as controls. This regression is not weighted by car market shares to
eliminate the demand effect. The coefficient of the rebate reflects the percentage of the rebate
or fee that is passed through to the final price paid by consumers. I find that approximately
58% of the rebate or fee is passed through to the final price, which indicates a probable
reaction of car manufacturers. The regression also indicates that in 2008, the average price
of cars decreases more than in previous years: the average price decreases by e137 in 2008,
compared to only e88 in 2007. This stronger reduction in price may be the consequence
of strategic interactions between car manufacturers: the feebate modifies the entire price
equilibrium, including the prices of cars not directly affected. The structural model below
describes the manufacturers’ optimal pricing strategies and the optimal responses to the
feebate.
To check for signs of policy anticipation by French car manufacturers in the data, I use
a difference-in-differences approach to compare the CO2 emissions of French manufacturers
with those of other car manufacturers after the policy’s introduction. If the design of the
feebate policy were the consequence of lobbying, we could expect French lobbyists to be more
active than lobbyists for foreign car manufacturers. I regress the CO2 emissions of all cars (not
weighted by their market shares) on year dummies, a dummy for French car manufacturers
and an interaction term between the French dummy and the year 2008. The results suggest
no sign of anticipation by French manufacturers, and this is robust across specifications. The
details of the regressions investigating the supply-side reactions are provided in Tables 17
and 18 in Appendix D.1.
3 Model
In this section, I present a model of demand and supply for new automobiles both under
and in the absence of the feebate regulation. The model allows for heterogeneous preferences
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Table 2: Regression of the average characteristics of car purchases on the demographic
characteristics of the municipality
























































































































































































































































































































R2 0.262 0.208 0.518 0.562 0.576 0.781 0.515 0.776
Note: The average price is in e100, rebate is in e10, and income is in e10,000. “%” stands for the percentage of households
in each category. The household sizes and professional activities are in 10%. %Diesel is the share of diesel cars (in %).
CO2 emissions are in g/km; CO, NOX and HC emissions are in mg/km, and PM emissions are in mg/10 km. The reference
categories are singles, retired and rural cities. All specifications include year×county fixed effects and are estimated using 180,045
observations, except the regression with the rebate as the dependent variable, which includes only county fixed effects and uses
30,848 observations from 2008. The reported year fixed effects are the averages of the year×county fixed effects, weighted by the
number of households. The regressions are weighted by the number of households. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
related to demographic characteristics. The demand is represented by a random coefficients
logit model that is similar to the model used in Nurski and Verboven (2016). The supply
model formalises the pricing strategies of car manufacturers, which are multi-product firms
that compete with each other as in the standard model of Berry et al. (1995).
3.1 Demand
I consider nm potential buyers from municipality m choosing either to purchase or not one
of the J cars offered (the latter is the outside option and is denoted by 0). Consumers do
12
not have preferences for the cars themselves but for car attributes. Each consumer, denoted
by i, maximises her utility, which is a linear function of the car characteristics and the price.
The index j stands for the car. I omit the year index to keep the number of indexes small.
uimj = xjβm + αmpj + ξj + εimj.
xj and ξj represent observed and unobserved car characteristics, respectively, and pj is the
price. εimj is an individual and car-specific preference term, which is assumed to be identically
and independently distributed according to an extreme value. βm and αm are the parameters
for preferences for car attributes and price sensitivity, respectively. These parameters are
common to all individuals within a municipality. I further assume that these parameters are
deterministic functions of demographic characteristics:
βm = β̄ + Σ
Xd′m and αm = ᾱ + dmσp,
where dm is the vector of demographic characteristics of the consumers in municipality m.
ΣX is the matrix of heterogeneity parameters that link individual preference for car attributes
to the vector of demographic characteristics. σp is, similarly, the vector of heterogeneity
parameters for price sensitivity. The mean utility of the outside option is normalised to 0 so
that uim0 = εim0. The utility function can be expressed as the sum of the mean utility (δj),
a deviation from this mean related to the demographic characteristics of the municipality
(µmj) and an individual error term:
uimj = δj + µmj + εimj.
Because of the distribution of εimj, the probability that consumer i from municipality m
chooses car j, which is also equal to the market share of car j in the municipality, is expressed
as:
simj = smj =
exp (δj + µmj)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp (δk + µmk)
.





exp (δj + µmj)
1 +
∑J
k=1 exp (δk + µmk)
,





I assume that the car market is an oligopolistic market with F firms selling differentiated
cars. Car manufacturers have market power and set their prices, taking into account demand
and the prices of competitors.8 I assume that car manufacturers set their prices nationally,
8I abstract here from modelling the vertical relations between car manufacturers and dealers and assume
perfect integration, such that the manufacturers set the final prices paid by the consumers.
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so there is no price discrimination across municipalities. This assumption is consistent with
the use of catalogue prices as optimal prices since I do not observe transaction prices.9 The






nmsmj(p)× (pj − cj) ,
where cj is the marginal cost. smj(p) is the market share of product j that depends on the
prices of all the cars, which are represented by the vector p. The optimal price pj is derived













= 0, ∀j ∈ F . (1)
3.3 Market equilibrium under the feebate regulation
The feebate regulation modifies consumers’ optimal choices and firms’ pricing strategies. Let
λj be the rebate or fee associated with the level of CO2 emissions of car model j. I adopt the
convention that λj is positive for a fee and negative for a rebate. For this analysis, p̃ denotes
the vector of the prices set by car manufacturers under the feebate regulation. Consumer i’s
utility is modified as follows:
ũimj = xjβm + αm(p̃j + λj) + ξj + εimj.















where δ̃j = xjβ̄+ ᾱ(p̃j+λj)+ξj and µ̃mj = xjΣ
Xd′m +(p̃j+λj)dmσp. Car manufacturers set
their prices taking into account the potential rebates and taxes that consumers are subject







s̃mj(p̃ + λ)× (p̃j − cj) .













= 0, ∀j ∈ F . (2)
9I could apply the methodology developed by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2019) to allow for unobserved price
discrimination across municipalities, but the computation cost would be very high given a large number of
municipalities.
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Let p̃nj = p̃j + λj denote the price net of rebate or fee and p̃
n the vector of net prices. I can














= 0, ∀j ∈ F .
The effect of the feebate on pricing strategies is identical to a marginal cost increase (for
a fee) or reduction (for a rebate). Because of market power and strategic interactions, not
all of the fee or rebate is passed through to the consumer; instead, car manufacturers adapt
their margins. Car manufacturers are able to extract part of the rebate by increasing the
prices of cars with rebates. In the case of a fee, car manufacturers lower their price and
decrease their margins to avoid large reductions in sales.
3.4 Estimation
I estimate the parameters of utility using the generalised method of moments. I use the
standard aggregate demand and supply moments, as in Berry et al. (1995), complemented
with micro-moments in the spirit of Berry et al. (2004) and Petrin (2002). The micro-
moments leverage the information on car sales at the municipality level and ensure the
identification of the heterogeneity parameters. Specifically, I use the covariance between the
characteristics of car purchases and the demographic characteristics across municipalities,
as in Nurski and Verboven (2016). I do not directly use sales at the municipality level for
two related reasons. First, there are many null market shares, which the logit model cannot
rationalise given the assumption that the error term is extreme value distributed. Second,
sales at the local level fail to generate precise estimates of the market shares because there
are only a few sales in each municipality: the maximum number of car sales is 433, and the
average number of sales is 19. The estimates of the local market shares are too sensitive to
the presence of outliers and are not reliable for estimating the demand model. I instead rely
on annual national aggregate market shares and use local sales in the micro-moments.
Once I estimate the demand parameters, I can back out the marginal costs for all car
models and each year by inverting the system of first-order equations associated to firms’
profit maximisation problem given by Equation (1) without the feebate policy and Equation
(2) under the feebate policy.
Aggregate moments. The aggregate moment conditions are based on the interaction of
unobserved product characteristics ξj with the instruments zj. The vector ξ is unobserved,
but it is such that the theoretical market shares are equal to the observed market shares:
sobsj = sj(ξ,θ)
θ represents the vector of the parameters (β̄, ᾱ,ΣX ,σp). To invert the market share equation
and recover the vector of the unobserved product characteristics ξ, I use the contraction
mapping suggested by Berry et al. (1995). The price pj is endogenous because it is likely to
be correlated with the unobserved product characteristics ξj. The firms have market power,
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and their pricing decisions depend on demand, including its unobserved component. The
instruments that I use are functions of other products’ characteristics, such as those used in
Berry et al., 1995 (more details are provided in the next section). The moment conditions







In addition to the moment conditions from the demand side, I construct moment conditions
using the supply side, starting from the specification of the marginal cost equation:
ln cj = x
s
jγ + ωj
ln (pj −mj(θ)) = xsjγ + ωj,
where mj(θ) is the margin of car j obtained from the price optimality condition, x
s
j represents
the observable cost shifters, and ωj represents the unobservable cost shocks. The moment
conditions are based on the independence between the cost shocks and the instruments Zs:









Micro-moments. The micro-moments exploit the information on demographic characteristics
and product market shares of products at the municipality level. The micro-moments
match (i) the predicted average demographic characteristics of the car purchasers and (ii)
the covariances between the demographic characteristics and the product characteristics
with their empirical counterparts. The sets of micro-moments are crucial for identifying
the observed heterogeneity, as noted in Berry et al. (2004), Petrin (2002) and Nurski and
Verboven (2016). For this analysis sj, smj, d̄, and x̄ denote the observed aggregate market
share, municipality market share, mean demographic characteristics and mean product
characteristics, respectively, while sj(θ), smj(θ), d̄(θ), and x̄(θ) are the predicted values






























Since I exactly match the aggregate market shares, sj(θ) = sj and x̄(θ) = x̄, and the




















The model is static and abstracts from the dynamic aspects related to the car purchase
decision. Because a car is a durable good that is used for several years and can be sold on a
second-hand car market, consumer anticipation of future car prices and characteristics and
second-hand car market characteristics play a role in the purchase decisions. The dynamic
aspects related to the existence of the secondary market have been studied by Gavazza et al.
(2014) and Chen et al. (2013). The first paper focuses on the allocative effects of the second-
hand car market, while the second focuses on the competition of car manufacturers with
themselves through the secondary market. Abstracting from modelling the dynamics and the
second-hand car market may lead to bias in price elasticity and mark-up estimates, as shown
by Chen et al. (2008). However, these dynamic models cannot account for the heterogeneity
in car characteristics and CO2 emissions. The cars are treated as a homogeneous product
with a single dimension of heterogeneity, the vintage. Such a dynamic model would not
be relevant for the analysis of the feebate policy, the effect of which is precisely to induce
substitution from high CO2-emitting cars to low CO2-emitting cars.
In not modelling the decision as dynamic and abstracting from the second-hand car market,
I am not able to investigate three aspects of the feebate policy. First, I cannot investigate the
policy’s impact on the purchase decision through a change in consumers’ expectations. The
policy may change households’ expectations about future fuel efficiency technology, as they
anticipate car manufacturers will develop fuel-efficient cars at lower costs. As a consequence,
some individuals, in particular those most sensitive to fuel costs, may prefer to wait before
buying a new car. Second, my analysis neglects the effects of the policy on the second-hand
car market. Since new car prices are modified by the feebate introduction, resale prices are
likely to be modified in 2008 and in the years after, implying some additional welfare and
distributional effects that my analysis does not take into account. The third effect that I
do not evaluate is the impact of the policy on emissions through a change in cars’ lifetimes.
The policy is likely to increase the lifetimes of cars with taxes that become more expensive
and decrease those of rebated cars that are cheaper. This constitutes an adverse effect of the
policy since polluting cars end up less frequently renewed. This is the Gruenspecht (1982)
effect, and it reduces the environmental benefit of a policy (see Jacobsen and Van Benthem,




I estimate the model with heterogeneity relying on the three sets of moments derived in the
previous section. I also estimate a simple logit model without heterogeneity in preferences
using moments from demand and supply only. The observed product characteristics introduced
in the utility function are the price (net of the feebate in 2008), fuel cost, horsepower, cylinder
capacity, weight (as a proxy for car size), and type of car body (coupe, wagon or sedan).
I use data obtained from the French National Survey Institute on the average fuel prices
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for each year to compute the average cost of driving 100 kilometres. I do not observe cars’
fuel consumption levels directly, but I can infer them using the engineering formula that
links a car’s CO2 emissions to the fuel consumption.
10 I also include year fixed effects to
capture symmetric shocks to the automobile market and brand fixed effects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity of cars at the brand level. I allow for heterogeneity in terms of
price sensitivity, fuel cost, weight and cylinder capacity. I assume that price sensitivity is
a linear function of income, while I allow fuel cost sensitivity to depend on income and
municipality size. I consider that the valuation for car weight can be different in rural (less
than 20,000 inhabitants) and urban (more than 20,000 inhabitants) areas. Finally, I allow
the valuation of cylinder capacity to depend on household size. Household size is represented
by the percentage of households in each of these two categories: households with children
and households without children. Finally, I consider the following variables as cost shifters:
horsepower, fuel consumption (in litres for 100 kilometres), weight and cylinder capacity. I
also introduce brand fixed effects in the cost function.
The estimation method relies on instruments, making the standard assumption that product
characteristics other than price are exogenous and using these product characteristics as
instruments. I construct additional instruments that are functions of the characteristics of
other products. The characteristics of competing products are correlated with the price
through strategic interactions across firms: if a car has close substitutes, it has lower market
power and, therefore, a lower price. I also use functions of the characteristics of other cars
of the same brand. The argument is similar: if the brand offers many close substitutes to
a car, then the manufacturer has high market power and is able to set a high price. More
precisely, I use three sets of instruments: the sums of the characteristics of all the other
brands’ cars, the sums of the characteristics of other cars of the same brand and the sums of
the characteristics of the other brands’ cars in the same segment. I consider eight segments:
mini, small family, large family, executive, small minivan, large minivan, sports and all road.
I use the same instruments to construct the demand and supply moments but do not use
instruments to form the micro-moments.
I estimate the model using a sample of municipalities to reduce the computation cost
associated with the calculation of aggregate market shares. The market share inversion uses
the contraction mapping proposed by Berry et al. (1995), which involves the computation of
the aggregate market shares many times. I randomly draw 3,000 municipalities (approximately
10% of all municipalities) with a weight that is proportional to the number of households.11
For the data to be consistent with the model, I use aggregate market shares, which are
computed by summing the sales over the municipalities sampled. Because the feebate policy
was announced at the end of November 2007, there was room for arbitrage: households
could bring forward or postpone their car purchases by a couple of months to escape the
fees or obtain rebates. This could introduce non-stationarity in the car sales of December
2007 and January 2008 and bias the parameter estimates. To limit this effect, I exclude the
car registrations from December and January for each year to compute the annual market
10The fuel consumption (in L/km) ψj of car j is related to the CO2 emissions (in g/km) through the
following formula: CO2j = ψj × kf(j), where kf(j) reflects the quantity of CO2 emissions in a liter of fuel
and is equal to 2,287 g/L for gasoline cars and 2,686 g/L for diesel cars.
11The sample is representative of the full population as Table 19 in Appendix D.1 suggests.
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shares. While my model is estimated on aggregate sales calculated over ten months and a
sample of 3,000 municipalities, the welfare analysis covers the full year and the full sample
of municipalities.
It is necessary to aggregate different versions of products to obtain exploitable variations
in market shares across products and to obtain a choice set of a reasonable size. I define a
product (car model) as a brand, model name, body style, and class of CO2 emissions. I do
not use the fuel type to directly define car models, but it is highly correlated with the class of
CO2 emissions, so cars with different fuel types are generally in two different classes of CO2
emissions and are therefore considered to be two different car models. For each car model,
I assign the characteristics of the most frequently purchased version of the car model. I
finally obtain 5,028 different car models for the six years covered by my dataset. To compute
the market shares of the products and an outside option, I assume the potential market is
one-fourth of the total number of households. For the estimation, I use one-fourth of the
total number of households from the sample of selected municipalities multiplied by a factor
of 10/12 to account for the fact that annual market shares are calculated from car sales over
ten months.
4.2 Parameter estimates
Table 3 displays the estimated parameters for the models both with and without heterogeneity
in consumer preferences. Price and fuel cost have significant negative coefficients. The
estimates of the model with heterogeneity are in line with those of the simple model. Since the
parameters of heterogeneity are significant, I use the model with heterogeneity as the main
specification. Weight, horsepower and cylinder capacity are characteristics that consumers
appreciate. On average, individuals prefer sedans or convertibles to cars with a wagon body.
I find, surprisingly, that price sensitivity increases with income. Crawford et al. (2019) also
find such a surprising income effect for demand for cable TV. On the other hand, sensitivity
to the fuel cost decreases with income, as expected. This sensitivity is also lower in urban
municipalities than in rural areas, but the heterogeneity parameter is small relative to the
average fuel cost sensitivity parameter. I find that consumers living in urban municipalities
place less value on car weight, reflecting heterogeneity in car usage across municipalities
according to population density. I also observe that households without children value
cylinder capacity less than other household types. From the demand parameters and using
the full sample of municipalities, I compute the car margins and find significant market power
in the car market: the average mark-up rate is 41.7% in 2008. I provide in Appendix D.2
some additional estimation results and present the robustness checks to investigate potential
issues related to using the year 2008 in the estimation.
5 Analysis of the policy effects
5.1 Aggregate effects of the feebate
Nature of the counterfactual. The impact of the feebate policy on the car market is
inferred from the difference between the market equilibrium under the feebate and the market
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Table 3: Estimation results
Model w/o heterogeneity Model with heterogeneity
Parameter Std. err. Parameter Std. err.
Utility parameters
Price (e10,000) -1.56∗∗ 0.013 -0.675∗∗ 0.074
Horsepower 0.296∗∗ 0.018 0.29∗∗ 0.018
Fuel cost (e/100 km) -0.386∗∗ 0.015 -0.797∗∗ 0.022
Weight (100 kg) 0.305∗∗ 0.015 0.349∗∗ 0.015
Cylinder capacity (1,000 cm3) 0.005 0.011 0.292∗∗ 0.012
Convertible -0.103 0.088 -0.079 0.085
Wagon -0.866∗∗ 0.063 -0.852∗∗ 0.062
Intercept -9.05∗∗ 0.236 -8.51∗∗ 0.233
Income × fuel cost 0.227∗∗ 0.01
Income × price -0.509∗∗ 0.039
Urban × fuel cost 0.035∗∗ 0.005
Urban × weight -0.034∗∗ 0.003
%Without children × cylinder -0.537∗∗ 0.015
Note: Price and income are in constant 2008 e; horsepower is the fiscal horsepower. “Urban” is a dummy for
municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, and “%Without children” is the frequency of households without children
in the municipality. Both models are estimated using 5,028 car models and include brand and year dummies in the utility
and the marginal cost functions. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
equilibrium in the absence of the feebate. For consistency, both situations are simulated
using the demand parameters, car marginal costs and the full sample of municipalities. The
marginal costs are obtained from the system of equations associated with price optimality
(Equation 2), assuming the observed prices in 2008 are optimal for the full sample of
municipalities under the feebate. This implies that my model perfectly predicts the observed
prices but does not necessarily perfectly predict the market shares at the national level.
Alternatively, I could rely on the vector of marginal costs obtained by assuming price
optimality for the sample of 3,000 municipalities. This alternative approach benefits from
being consistent with the estimation approach that relies on the price optimality condition
for the same sample. Yet, it seems more appropriate to recover the marginal costs using the
full sample of municipalities because it exploits more information. I estimate the marginal
costs using the two approaches and find that they are almost identical: the average absolute
difference is only 0.43%, and for 97.5% of the car models, the cost difference is below 2%.
As Table 23 in Appendix D.3 reveals, the aggregate outcomes (car sales, profits and budget
costs) are very close using the two alternative cost vectors. This table also shows that
they are consistent with the observed outcomes, confirming that my model is relevant for
describing the car market at the national level.
Gains and losses for consumers are measured through the variation in their surplus, which
is the expected utility of their best car choice. So the average variation in consumer surplus
due to the feebate is the difference in expected utilities with and without the feebate. Since
the only source of heterogeneity within each municipality is the individual and product-
specific preference shock εik, individual surpluses are identical in the same municipality.
Given the distributional assumption on this preference shock (see Small and Rosen, 1981),
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the expression for the average surplus variation for municipality m is:

















where δk and µmk represent the mean utility and the municipality-specific portion of the
utility in the absence of the feebate policy, respectively, while δ̃k and µ̃mk are those under
the feebate policy. αm is the price sensitivity of municipality m and is negative. tm is the
tax introduced to finance the cost of the feebate. I first consider a uniform, per consumer
tax t to subsidise the deficit. t is such that:
n× t = b.
n is the total number of potential buyers (one-fourth of the total number of French households),
and b is the deficit. I obtain t = e29.3. I also examine a tax that is proportional to the
income to offset the deficit. I solve for the tax rate τ such that the total tax revenue is equal
to the deficit: ∑
m
(τ × im)nm = b,
where im and nm are the median income and the number of potential car buyers of the
municipality m. I obtain τ = 15.7
10,000
, implying municipality taxes between e11.6 and e79.7
with a median of e27.9, which is slightly below the uniform tax. Ultimately, the type of
tax used to subsidise the deficit generated by the feebate policy does not affect the total
consumer surplus or the total welfare effect. This result occurs because I specify a linear
utility function that rules out any income effect. However, the type of tax used has important
consequences for the distribution of gains and losses across municipalities.
Feebate pass-through. Before the analysis of the welfare and environmental effects of
the feebate scheme, I investigate how car prices are modified in response to the policy. I
find that prices are not so different without the feebate, indicating a high pass-through of
fees and rebates. I find an average pass-through of 101.9% for cars subject to either a fee
or a rebate. In addition, only 5% of car models have a pass-through below 100%. This
suggests that the feebate is overshifted to the car price, which contrasts with the 60% pass-
through I estimate using the reduced-form approach.12 Such an overshifting of the feebate is
nevertheless consistent with the theoretical framework developed by Anderson et al. (2001).
Bonnet and Réquillart (2013), and Griffith et al. (2018) also find an overshifting of taxes in
the context of grocery items (soda drinks and margarine products, respectively). The reason
for tax overshifting is that the fees soften competition among car manufacturers for cars
subject to taxes and increase competition for cars affected by rebates. The average posted
price increase due to the feebate policy is modest and is equal to only e13.5. Even the
maximum posted price increase reaches the modest value of e82. Table 24 in Appendix D.3
12The reduced-form pass-through estimates could be biased for several reasons: the reduced-form equation
may be misspecified, there may be within-car model unobservable characteristics that are correlated to the
amount of rebate or fee, or the inference may be invalid because car prices are not independent, which
violates the i.i.d. assumption.
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presents the absolute values of the pass-through and the pass-through rates (in percentage
of the fee or rebate) by CO2 emissions class.
Effects on households and car manufacturers. As Table 4 shows, the feebate stimulates
the car market, with an increase in the sales of new cars by approximately 23,000 units. My
model does not specify the exact form of the outside option, so I cannot distinguish whether
these extra new sales are due to a substitution from a purchase on the second-hand market,
early replacement of an old car or new car owners. The origin of new car sales is not relevant
for the estimates of welfare effects of the policy on households and car manufacturers but
has important consequences for the environmental impacts of the policy.
Using the estimates for marginal costs, I am able to compute the manufacturers’ margins
for each car and the additional profits generated by the feebate. The feebate increases
overall industry profits by 2.1%, but French manufacturers’ profits increase by almost twice
as much (3.8%). The net profit increase for French manufacturers (+e157.5 million) is
greater than the total industry net profit increase (+e156.9 million). This suggests that some
manufacturers experience losses because of the policy. I precisely identify the winners and
losers across car manufacturers in Section 5.2. I further decompose the rise in manufacturer
profits to disentangle the gains from extra sales (the extensive margin) from the gains from
increased margins (the intensive margin). I find that e8.85 million can be attributed to the
rise of carmakers’ margins while e148.1 million are attributable to extra sales. The extensive
margin is, therefore, the most important margin and accounts for 94% of the profit increase.
The profit decomposition is very similar for French manufacturers.
Total consumer surplus increases because of the feebate policy, with a net gain of e172
million (which corresponds to a rise of 2.1%). However, this increase is lower than the cost
of the feebate, which reaches e211.6 million. These figures imply that there is a negative
variation of e39 million in total consumer surplus when the deficit is offset by a tax on
individuals. The diesel car share increases by 0.44 percentage points because of the feebate.
This seems relatively small, but it is similar in magnitude to the annual trend in the diesel
share increase (I estimate the diesel share to increase by 0.94 percentage points per year).13
My estimate of the feebate’s effect on the diesel share is comparable to almost half of a year’s
worth of a jump in this share.
Effects on emissions. The change in average emissions reflects the modification of the
composition of the car fleet caused by the feebate policy. The variation in total emissions is
also affected by the increase in total car sales and substitution towards diesel cars, which are
assumed to be driven 7,000 kilometres more than gasoline cars annually. The main objective
of the feebate is to reduce CO2 emissions, and indeed the feebate is responsible for a decrease
of 2.2 g/km in the average CO2 emissions of new cars. This corresponds to a reduction of 1.6%
in average emissions. This figure might appear small, but it is 34% higher than the annual
trend in average CO2 emissions observed over the period 2003-2007 (-1.64 g/km annually).
14
13This trend is estimated by regressing a dummy for diesel car purchases on an intercept and a time trend
over the period 2003-2007.
14This is estimated by regressing CO2 emissions on a time trend using car sales over the period 2003-2007.
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Table 4: Welfare and environmental effects of the feebate policy
Feebate No Variation
Feebate (in %)
Total sales (1,000 units) 1,223 1,200 1.91
Share of diesel (%) 70.97 70.53 0.62
Profits French (Me) 4,322 4,164 3.78
Profits all (Me) 7,645 7,488 2.1
Consumer surplus (Me) 8,551 8,379 2.05
Average emissions
CO2 (g/km) 138.56 140.82 -1.6
NOX (mg/km) 147.44 146.71 0.50
PM (mg/10 km) 68.94 68.71 0.33
CO (mg/km) 243.40 243.85 -0.18
HC (mg/km) 32.13 32.19 -0.18
Note: “Me” stands for millions of euros.
This is consistent with the price effect of the feebate estimated by D’Haultfœuille et al. (2016)
but lower than the 4% reduction in average CO2 emissions estimated by D’Haultfœuille et al.
(2014). The difference stems from the fact that I evaluate the pecuniary impact while they
assess the total policy effect, including the potential informational and behavioural channels.
This decrease in average CO2 emissions is accompanied by modest declines in average
emissions of CO and HC (-0.18% for both pollutants). In contrast, the average emissions of
PM and NOX, the most hazardous local pollutants, increase because of the feebate: average
NOX emissions increase by 0.5%, while average PM emissions increase by 0.33%. These
figures confirm the trade-off between global and local air pollution and that the feebate
policy sacrifices local air quality to reduce CO2 emissions. The effects of the feebate on local
pollutant emissions are quite significant once the figures are converted into annual emissions.
All annual emissions of local pollutants increase between 2.04% and 2.47%, primarily driven
by the increase in new car sales. I also find an increase in annual CO2 emissions even though
average emissions decrease. I estimate that the feebate generates 12,284 extra tons of CO2
emissions annually, corresponding to an increase of less than 0.5%.
The increase in emissions of new cars is compensated by a decrease in emissions from
the outside good, provided that a share of the extra car sales are early car replacements. I
consider three scenarios for the origin of the extra new car sales. In the first and benchmark
scenario, I consider the proportions of old car owners and non-motorized households within
the share of households choosing the outside option to be identical both in the presence and
absence of the feebate. The second scenario is optimistic and assumes that all extra car sales
from the feebate are for replacements of old cars. It implies that the share of non-motorized
households who choose the outside option remains constant both under and in the absence
of the feebate policy. The third scenario makes a pessimistic assumption and considers all
extra feebate-induced car sales constitute new drivers or households that acquire additional
vehicles and drive more. The distribution of the households according to their car ownership
status (new car owner, old car owner or no car) under the different scenarios is presented in
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Table 25 in Appendix D.3.
Under the benchmark and optimistic scenarios, I find that the feebate policy decreases
emissions of the outside option by 0.38% and 0.48%, respectively. These figures, although
small, imply large amounts of emissions avoided from the outside option because the number
of households choosing the outside option is large. Table 5 shows that under the benchmark
scenario, 40,500 tons of CO2 are avoided, which more than compensates for the extra 12,000
tons from new cars. Under the second scenario, which considers all extra new car sales to
be early replacements, emissions from the outside option decrease by 51,200 tons. This is
because the average CO2 emissions from an average old car are much higher than the new
car emissions in 2008. The emissions of PM and HC avoided from households choosing the
outside option are greater than the extra emissions from new cars under the two scenarios.
For the emissions of CO, compensation between avoided and new emissions occurs only under
the optimistic scenario. For NOX emissions, however, the increase in new car emissions is not
compensated by emissions savings from the households choosing the outside option. This
results from the combination of two effects: (i) the average emissions of NOX from the outside
option are lower than the average car emissions in 2008, and (ii) the average NOX emissions
of new cars are greater under the feebate than in its absence. The lower bounds of the net
feebate effects indicate that the feebate potentially generates a net reduction of all types of
emissions except for NOX.
I use these bounds and the estimates of the social costs of emissions suggested by the
report of the DG MOVE (2014) to convert the policy’s environmental effects into monetary
terms. The increases in emissions of CO2 and NOX are the costliest for society. The cost
of the net increase in NOX emissions is between e185,000 and e945,000. The effect of the
feebate on the emissions of PM is estimated to be between a cost of e344,000 and a benefit
of e160,000. Under the optimistic scenario, the gains from the reduction in CO2 emissions
reach e1.56 million. Even though there is a net decrease in the emissions of PM and HC
under the benchmark and optimistic scenarios, once they are converted to monetary terms,
they do not compensate the cost from the increase in NOX emissions. The total policy cost
in terms of emissions of local pollutants is between e15,000 and e1.31 million.
Table 5: Effects of the feebate on annual emissions
∆Emissions ∆Emissions Range of Range of
new cars outside option net effect net cost
(in tons) (in tons) (in tons) (in M e)
(1) (2) (3)
CO2 12,284 -40,520 -51,177 0 [-38,894, 12,284] [-1.56, 0.491]
NOX 72 -46 -58 0 [14, 72] [0.185, 0.945]
PM 3.3 -3.8 -4.8 0 [-1.5, 3.3] [-0.160, 0.344]
CO 80 -71 -90 0 [-9.8, 80] 0
HC 11 -14 -17 0 [-6.2, 11] [-0.0104, 0.0187]
Total local pollutant [0.015, 1.31]
Note: Variation of annual emissions (in tons) and cost of emissions (in millions of euros) caused by the
feebate. (1): benchmark. (2): “optimistic”. (3): “pessimistic”.
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I evaluate the robustness of the net cost from local pollutant emissions to the use of the
heterogeneous social costs of emissions calibrated in Appendix C. I rely on the benchmark
assumption for the origin of extra new car sales. The results are presented in Table 26 in
Appendix D.3. The net feebate cost related to local pollutant emissions is estimated to
be between e0.095 and e0.324 million, depending on the specification, indicating that my
benchmark estimate of e0.284 million is rather conservative. The overall welfare policy effect
is not very sensitive to the estimates of the social cost of local pollutants. The lowest cost is
obtained when the emissions cost is a quadratic function of the population density. In this
specification, the total costs of NOX and PM emissions are much lower than in the benchmark
case, reflecting that the feebate raises emissions where population densities are lowest. In
contrast, I estimate a higher policy cost when the social costs are discontinuous functions
of average car emissions. Under these two discontinuous cost scenarios, the decrease in the
emissions from the outside option generates lower gains than in the scenarios with uniform
social costs.
Feebate balance. I determine the net annual feebate value by balancing benefits with
costs, including the budget cost and social costs of emissions. I provide here the first
evaluation of the feebate policy that accounts for both emissions of global and local pollutants
(D’Haultfœuille et al., 2014 only evaluate the social cost of CO2 emissions in their short-
and long-run analysis of the policy). The gains for car manufacturers (e157 million) and
households (e172 million) have to be balanced with the budget cost and the cost of the extra
emissions. As the previous results suggest, there is a net environmental loss only under the
assumption that the new car sales are new drivers (pessimistic scenario). This pessimistic
scenario still implies a large positive balance for the feebate policy, with a net welfare gain
of e115.6 million. This gain reaches e119 million under the optimistic scenario, while it is
estimated to be e118.3 million for the benchmark scenario. These results are provided in
Table 6.
I implicitly assumed away any shadow cost of public funds. A shadow cost of public funds
of 1.56 would be necessary to obtain budget neutrality, implying that the government needs
to pay e1.56 to spend one euro under the feebate policy. This value seems higher than
typical estimates from the literature (for instance, Ballard et al., 1985 estimate a shadow
cost lower than 1.39 for consumer sales tax). The feebate policy is welfare improving under
reasonable values for the shadow cost of public funds. The main reason for this net positive
gain is the significant increase in carmarkers’ profits, which as previously noted, is mainly
driven by the stimulation of new car sales. The welfare analysis provided here is partial
and neglects any policy effect outside the car market and neglects dynamic effects. Perhaps
individuals who buy a car reduce their expenses on other goods, which I do not account
for in this partial analysis. The feebate stimulates the car market by generating some car
replacements, as my benchmark scenario assumes. Car sales may decrease in the future, but
this is not accounted for in my analysis and contributes to this positive balance.
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Table 6: Cost-benefit analysis of the feebate policy
Benchmark Optimistic Pessimistic
Cost of the policy (-) 211.6 211.6 211.6
∆ Consumer surplus 172.1 172.1 172.1
∆ Profits 156.9 156.9 156.9
∆ Cost CO2 new cars (-) 0.491 0.491 0.491
∆ Cost local pollution new cars (-) 1.31 1.31 1.31
∆ Cost CO2 outside option (-) -1.62 -2.05 0
∆ Cost local pollution outside (-) -1.02 -1.29 0
∆ Welfare 118.3 119.0 115.6
Note: in millions of euros. “(-)” means the value has to be subtracted to obtain the balance.
5.2 Distributional effects
Heterogeneity across individuals. I first analyse the heterogeneity of the effects of
the feebate across consumers, which is the direct consequence of preference heterogeneity.
Intuitively, we expect an individual to gain from the feebate if the cars that this consumer
likes become cheaper. I investigate in Appendix D.4 the partial effect of each demographic
characteristic on the variations of consumer surplus, both in level and percentage. I find
that the income has two effects that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, richer
individuals are more sensitive to the price, leaving them more reactive to the policy. On the
other hand, they do not value the car’s fuel efficiency, so they do not gain by substituting to
fuel-efficient cars. This is why the variation of the consumer surplus from the feebate is the
largest for middle income individuals. Given the form of the surplus function, the different
parameters of heterogeneity interact so the net effect of the feebate on individuals remain
an empirical question that I investigate below.
I first analyse the heterogeneity of the effects of the feebate across consumers, which is
the direct consequence of preference heterogeneity. Intuitively, we expect an individual to
gain from the feebate if the cars that this consumer likes become cheaper. I investigate
in Appendix D.4 the partial effect of each demographic characteristic on the variations of
consumer surplus, both in level and percentage. I find that income has two effects that
work in opposite directions. On the one hand, wealthier individuals are more sensitive to
the price, leaving them more reactive to the policy. On the other hand, they do not value
the car’s fuel efficiency, so they do not gain by substituting to fuel-efficient vehicles. This is
why the variation of the consumer surplus from the feebate is the largest for middle-income
individuals. Given the form of the surplus function, the different parameters of heterogeneity
interact, so the net effect of the feebate on individuals remains an empirical question that I
investigate below.
When the deficit is subsidised by a uniform tax, the analysis in levels is identical since
the variation in the average individual surplus is shifted by the amount of the tax (e29.3).
Under this scenario, all the income categories experience welfare losses except the top two
income deciles. The maximum average loss is e10.5, the figure for the lowest income decile.
On average, consumers lose e5.5, which represents an average of only 1.4% of their surplus.
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The results from analysing the variations of surplus in percentage terms are different from
the scenario without tax because the losses in relative terms are higher for individuals with
low baseline surplus, i.e. those in the middle-income category. It might also seem surprising
that the average variation in consumer surplus for the two highest income deciles is positive
in levels while they are negative in percentage terms. But it comes from the significant
remaining heterogeneity within these two income deciles. 36% of individuals in the ninth
income decile (38% for the tenth decile) have negative surplus variations, while 64% (62%
for the tenth decile) increase their surplus. Because the winners gain, on average, more than
the losers, the feebate has a small but positive effect on average. When analysing the surplus
variation in relative terms, the average rise in consumer surplus for the winners is smaller
than the average decrease of the losers implying an average negative effect of the feebate in
percentage terms.
When the deficit is offset by a tax that is proportional to the income, the distributional
effects are quite different since the top income class is associated with larger welfare gains and
higher taxes. At the same time, low-income individuals pay lower taxes. The low-income
category becomes the biggest winner since the individuals only lose e2.3 on average. In
absolute terms, the effects on the surplus are relatively homogeneous between the second
and the ninth income deciles (between -e5.36 and -e4.04), while the average surplus of the
tenth income decile decreases by e13.1. On average, the highest income class pays a tax
of e43.5, which is more than twice the average tax for the first income decile (e21.1). In
relative terms, the heterogeneity is less pronounced since the average loss for the highest
income decile represents only a small percentage of the surplus of the individuals in this
decile.
Next, I investigate heterogeneity in the effects of the feebate policy across different municipality
sizes. The welfare gains in level terms appear relatively homogeneous, with variations
from e19.3 for cities with between 100,000 and 200,000 inhabitants to e26.9 for rural
municipalities (under the no-tax scenario). In relative terms, the results are different since
the cities with 100,000-200,000 inhabitants have the highest relative gains. This is the
consequence of the relatively low utility of car ownership, in contrast with small municipalities
associated with high utility from holding a car. When the tax is proportional to income,
there is significant redistribution from the largest municipalities to the smallest ones. The
average individual surplus losses in cities of more than 200,000 inhabitants are between -e10
and -e7.4, representing variations in their surplus of -1.6% and -2%, respectively.
I provide additional results on the heterogeneity of the feebate effects across individuals
in Appendix D.4. First, I illustrate the relationship between the variation in individual
surplus and income in Figure 4 using local polynomial regressions. Under the uniform tax
scenario, the curve is bell-shaped. Under a proportional tax, the consumer surplus variation
is flat until e25,000 (a value close to the ninth income decile) and decreases slowly for the
surplus variation in percentage and more rapidly for variation in level terms. It suggests
that my analysis by income decile hides heterogeneity at the extreme top of the income
distribution and reveals that the feebate hurts very high-income individuals. Secondly, I use
an alternative method to analyse the role of income that relies on computing the variation in
consumer surplus associated with each income decile of the national income distribution
(Table 28). The results confirm that the losses are highest for low-income individuals
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Table 7: Average consumer surplus variation and average emissions variation by income
decile and population density
∆ consumer surplus ∆ emissions
No tax Unif. tax Prop. tax ∆NOX ∆PM ∆CO ∆HC
lev. % lev. % lev. % lev. % lev. % lev. % lev. %
Income decile
d1 14,800 18.8 2.21 -10.5 -1.56 -2.28 -0.54 0.37 0.23 0.14 0.19 0.044 0.023 -0.006 -0.018
d2 15,767 19 2.83 -10.3 -2.33 -5.1 -1.42 0.48 0.31 0.17 0.24 -0.18 -0.074 -0.033 -0.1
d3 16,489 20.3 2.85 -9.02 -1.92 -5.05 -1.27 0.52 0.34 0.19 0.26 -0.24 -0.098 -0.039 -0.12
d4 17,149 21.1 2.87 -8.13 -2.04 -5.31 -1.57 0.57 0.38 0.2 0.29 -0.31 -0.13 -0.048 -0.15
d5 17,767 22.1 2.86 -7.22 -1.87 -5.36 -1.57 0.61 0.42 0.21 0.31 -0.37 -0.15 -0.054 -0.17
d6 18,538 23.3 2.83 -5.99 -1.73 -5.26 -1.61 0.67 0.46 0.23 0.33 -0.44 -0.17 -0.061 -0.19
d7 19,588 25.5 2.69 -3.82 -1.37 -4.47 -1.45 0.72 0.5 0.24 0.36 -0.49 -0.2 -0.066 -0.2
d8 21,009 27.8 2.49 -1.44 -0.58 -4.04 -0.85 0.81 0.57 0.27 0.4 -0.61 -0.24 -0.077 -0.23
d9 23,339 29.9 2.45 0.63 -0.4 -4.67 -0.93 0.96 0.7 0.31 0.48 -0.82 -0.32 -0.1 -0.3
d10 50,695 30.4 2.71 1.1 -0.35 -13.1 -1.84 1.5 1.3 0.43 0.81 -1.7 -0.57 -0.2 -0.54
Population density
<2,000 26.4 2.26 -2.86 -0.66 -1.61 -0.39 0.59 0.39 0.2 0.29 -0.25 -0.1 -0.035 -0.11
2,000-4,999 26.9 2.59 -2.42 -0.84 -1.81 -0.63 0.61 0.41 0.22 0.31 -0.34 -0.14 -0.046 -0.14
5,000-9,999 25.9 2.63 -3.36 -0.98 -2.4 -0.7 0.61 0.41 0.21 0.31 -0.33 -0.14 -0.046 -0.14
10,000-19,999 23.4 2.82 -5.91 -1.31 -4.25 -0.98 0.59 0.4 0.21 0.3 -0.33 -0.13 -0.048 -0.15
20,000-49,999 19.7 3.01 -9.53 -2.31 -7.81 -1.9 0.69 0.49 0.23 0.35 -0.5 -0.2 -0.071 -0.21
50,000-99,999 20.2 2.98 -9.04 -2.2 -6.79 -1.72 0.65 0.45 0.22 0.33 -0.45 -0.18 -0.065 -0.2
100,000-199,999 19.3 3.14 -9.99 -2.77 -8.71 -2.4 0.71 0.51 0.24 0.36 -0.56 -0.22 -0.078 -0.24
200,000-2 million 21.5 2.94 -7.77 -2.19 -7.38 -2.04 0.75 0.54 0.25 0.38 -0.59 -0.22 -0.081 -0.24
Paris area 25.5 2.55 -3.77 -0.82 -10 -1.64 1.1 0.95 0.33 0.58 -1.1 -0.36 -0.13 -0.36
Average 23.8 2.68 -5.46 -1.41 -5.46 -1.31 0.72 0.53 0.24 0.37 -0.51 -0.19 -0.069 -0.2
Note: The second column of the first panel provides the value of the income decile. “lev.” represents variations in level terms
(e), while “%” represents variations in relative terms, using the value in the absence of feebate as a reference. Variations in level
terms are in e for consumer surplus, mg/km for emissions of NOX, CO and HC and mg/10 km for PM.
and reveal higher welfare losses at the top of the income distribution, implying even more
redistribution than my benchmark estimates suggest. Finally, I investigate the role of other
demographics (household size and socio-professional activity) to characterise the winners and
losers in Table 29. In the demand model, consumer preferences vary by income, type of area
(rural or urban) and household size (with or without children). The effect of the policy can
nevertheless be heterogeneous along with other demographic characteristics because these are
correlated with income, type of area and household size. The results reveal that the feebate
generates higher gains, in relative terms, for low and medium socio-professional categories
and hurts more families with children.
Heterogeneity across car manufacturers. Figure 1 displays the profit variation for
each car manufacturer. Although the feebate policy increases industry profits by 2.1%, the
gains are heterogeneous across manufacturers, and some are worse off because of the feebate
regulation. As previously noted, the increase in French manufacturers’ profits is greater than
the increase in profits for the sector overall. The distribution of gains and losses at the car
manufacturer level indicates that there are winners and losers. French manufacturers and
the Fiat Group (Italian) are the big winners, while the big losers are German manufacturers,
except Volkswagen, which is barely affected (its profits increase by only 0.15%). There is
more heterogeneity among Asian car manufacturers: most of them (Toyota, Nissan, Suzuki,
Honda, Mitsubishi, Subaru, Ssangyong) lose, but some improve their situation (Hyundai and
Mazda). Among American car manufacturers, Ford and GM are better off, while Chrysler
is severely harmed.
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The two French manufacturers gain the most: the PSA Group’s profits increase by e97.5
million, while the gains for the Renault Group amount to e60 million. The third-largest
winner from the feebate policy is Fiat, with e20 million additional profits. Fiat’s profits
increase the most in relative terms (6.3%). The increase in earnings in relative terms is
smaller for PSA (4.1%) and Renault (3.3%). Daimler (Mercedes) suffers the most in absolute
terms (-e13.5 million, which corresponds to a reduction in its profits of 6.1%.) Porsche is the
manufacturer with the most significant profit reduction in relative terms (-32.1%). Chrysler,
Mitsubishi, Ssangyong and Lada are significantly harmed by the feebate policy, with profit
reductions of 18.5%, 11.2%, 20.6% and 24.9%, respectively.































































































(b) Top 11-19 car manufacturers
Group ∆Π ∆%Π Group ∆Π ∆%Π
1 PSA 97.5 4.12 11 HYUNDAI 2.26 1.85
2 RENAULT 60 3.33 12 SUZUKI -0.691 -0.617
3 VOLKSWAGEN 1.26 0.147 13 MAZDA 0.2 0.367
4 FORD 10 2.27 14 HONDA -1.94 -4.39
5 GM 3.14 0.933 15 CHRYSLER -4.9 -18.5
6 FIAT 20.2 6.32 16 MITSUBISHI -1.25 -11.2
7 TOYOTA -0.285 -0.085 17 PORSCHE -2.86 -32.1
8 B.M.W. -4.34 -1.69 18 SUBARU -0.245 -6.55
9 DAIMLER -13.5 -6.14 19 SSANGYONG -0.619 -20.6
10 NISSAN -6.94 -4.2 20 LADA -0.026 -24.9
Note: “∆Π” represents profit variations in millions of euros, and “∆%Π” represents profit variations
in percentages of the profits without the feebate.
Heterogeneity in the emissions of local pollutants. I analyse the heterogeneity of
the feebate’s effects on the emissions of local pollutants. I do not analyse the distributional
impacts on CO2 emissions since these emissions do not directly affect the air quality of
individuals but rather have a global impact on the environment. Figure 5 in Appendix D.4
displays the distributions of the variations in average emissions for the four different air
pollutants. Even though the feebate increases the emissions of NOX and PM and decreases
the emissions of HC and CO, the magnitudes are heterogeneous across municipalities. HC
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and CO emissions increase in some municipalities because of the feebate policy, but the
increases are all lower than 0.24%.
I investigate in more detail how the heterogeneity in the feebate’s effect on emissions relates
to the demographic characteristics of municipalities. I first examine the average variation in
emissions by income decile. As Table 7 above shows, there are clear relations between the
variations in emissions and income deciles. Variations in both NOX and PM increase with
income, while variations in CO and HC emissions decrease. Emissions of CO even increase
in the lowest income decile while reducing in the other income deciles. The feebate appears
to be progressive for NOX and PM but regressive for CO and HC. Provided that NOX and
PM are more harmful and costly than HC and CO for individuals, I can conclude that the
feebate induces redistribution from rich to poor municipalities. The largest variations in
NOX and PM by income decile are 1.3% and 0.8%, respectively. These figures are far below
the maximum variation levels, indicating that some heterogeneity remains within the highest
income deciles.
Next, I compute the average variation in emissions levels by municipality size. A clear
pattern emerges once again: the most significant decreases in CO and HC emissions and
the largest increases in NOX and PM emissions occur in urban areas. In the Paris area, the
feebate causes a rise of 1.1 mg/km in average emissions of NOX , while in cities with fewer
than 20,000 inhabitants, the increase is lower than 0.41 mg/km. Similarly, the increase in
PM emissions is around 0.3% in municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, but the
rise is almost twice as large in the Paris area (+0.58%). Given that the levels of NOX and
PM emissions constitute a critical issue in large cities, the feebate’s unintended effect on
these emissions raises serious concerns.
Finally, I turn to the heterogeneity in the variation of emissions according to the initial
emissions levels. In the previous section, I find that the total cost of local pollutants increases
by at most 14% when using heterogeneous social costs that increase with average initial car
emissions or average air emissions concentrations (see Table 26 in Appendix D.3). This low
value indicates that the emissions do not increase too much where they are initially high.
But it may nevertheless hide some differences across pollutants and municipalities that I
investigate here. In the left panel of Figure 2, I plot the variations in average emissions in
percentage terms as a function of the initial emissions levels (i.e. average emissions of car
purchases in the absence of the feebate) using local polynomial regressions. These graphs
reveal that emissions of all the four pollutants increase most where they are initially the
lowest. This is because the feebate causes an increase in average emissions of NOX and PM
in urban and wealthy municipalities, which initially have low average emissions of NOX and
PM. Similarly, the feebate decreases the emissions of CO and HC where they are initially
higher, again in urban and wealthy municipalities. These municipalities typically have a
lower share of diesel cars, explaining this pattern. The feebate, therefore, achieves some
redistribution regarding emissions of local pollutants from the high-emissions municipalities
to the low-emissions municipalities.
I obtain rather different results for the heterogeneity across air emissions concentration
levels. A city’s air emissions concentration relates to many factors on top of car fleet
composition: traffic intensity, manufacturing activities and probably weather conditions that
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are more or less favourable to the dispersion of air particles. I obtain negative correlations
between air emissions concentrations and average car emissions across municipalities (between
-0.30 of -0.05 depending on the pollutant). The second panel of Figure 2 suggests that all
emissions increase most where they are medium or high, indicating a negative indirect effect
of the feebate policy on air quality. It is particularly the case of NOX emissions, which
increase the most where NO2 emissions are highest, i.e., in dense and rich municipalities
and the Paris area. I find slightly less heterogeneity in the variation in PM, CO and HC
emissions, but the emissions tend to rise most where air concentrations are medium or high.
In Appendix D.4, I provide the same graphs with variations in emissions in levels (Figure
6). I also show the detailed figures for the average change in emissions by emission deciles
(Table 30) and analyse where diesel shares increase most (Figure 7).
Figure 2: Emissions variation in percentage terms as a function of emissions levels















































































(b) Average air emissions concentrations
Note: Local polynomial regressions using second-order polynomials. Average car emissions are in mg/km except
PM emissions are in mg/10km. Concentrations of NO2, PM10 and C6H6 are in µg/m3. Concentrations of
CO are in mg/m3.
5.3 Performance of the feebate scheme
I assess the performance of the actual feebate scheme in terms of redistribution across
households and the limitation of emissions of local pollutants and the diesel car share. I
investigate alternative feebate schemes that achieve the same average CO2 emissions at the
same budget as that of the current policy. Since there is an infinite number of possible
thresholds, fees and rebates that generate these two outcomes, I restrict my attention to
linear feebate schemes with differentiated slopes. These linear feebate schemes are defined
by three parameters: the pivot point, the rebate slope and the fee slope. This restriction is
necessary because I have two outcomes to match: average CO2 emissions and the pecuniary
cost of the policy. Therefore, for a given pivot point, the marginal tax and rebate rates are
pinned down by matching these two outcomes to those of the current feebate. I consider
three classes of feebate schemes that differ in their applicability. The first feebate class applies
uniformly to all cars. The second penalises diesel cars by preventing them from receiving
rebates. The third disadvantages diesel cars by dividing their rebates by two while doubling
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their taxes. Formally, the feebate schemes of the three classes are given by:
λ
(1)
j = r × (ej − ē)1(ej ≤ ē) + t× (ej − ē)1(ej ≥ ē)
λ
(2)






× (ej − ē)1(ej ≤ ē) + r2 × (ej − ē)1(ej ≤ ē)1(fuel = gasoline)
+t× (ej − ē)1(ej ≥ ē) + t× (ej − ē)1(ej ≥ ē)1(fuel = diesel),
where λj represents the rebate (fee) associated with car model j, ej represents the CO2
emissions of the car, and ē is the pivot point that separates the positive from the negative
feebates. r (respectively t) is the marginal rebate (tax) rate for each unit of CO2 emissions
below (above) the pivot point.
I compare the current feebate scheme to the optimal schemes for several different outcomes
and several different objective functions. I use consumer surplus, national manufacturers’
profits, emissions of local pollutants and diesel car share as outcomes. I consider four
objective functions that put different weights for each municipality’s outcome in the global
objective: weights that are simply proportional to the population size; weights that are
proportional to the population size and favour municipalities with low initial outcomes; a
Rawlsian weighting scheme that puts all weight on the most disadvantaged municipality; and
a weighting system that takes into account only the difference between the best and the worst
outcomes as a measure of inequality. The different outcomes, objectives and corresponding
formalised objective functions are summarised in Table 31 of Appendix D.5.
In practice, I solve for the optimal feebate scheme associated with a given objective function
and outcome by performing a grid search. For each value of the pivot point, I solve for the
slope parameters r and t such that average CO2 emissions and the budget are the same as
under the actual feebate. Then, I select the optimal one for the defined objective function and
outcome among all these feebate schemes associated with the same CO2 emissions and budget
outcomes. I jointly solve the feebate’s slope parameters and the new market equilibrium
(optimal prices and market shares). I provide details on the strategy developed to reduce
the computation time in Appendix D.5.
Table 8 displays the potential gains from replacing the 2008 feebate scheme with an optimal
alternative feebate (optimal for a defined outcome and objective function). I provide in
parentheses the parameters of this optimal feebate: the pivot point (in g/km), the tax
rate and the rebate rate (both in e per g/km). For the consumer surplus outcome, the
first three columns suggest that the actual feebate performs very well for consumer surplus
maximisation. The best linear feebates with diesel penalisation have lower performance than
the actual feebate to maximise the simple weighted average surplus. The uniform feebates
provide positive but negligible gains, below 0.1%, relative to the existing feebate scheme.
In contrast, inequalities across individuals could be reduced: the current feebate scheme
achieves between 88.3 and 89.3% of the best potential redistribution outcome, depending
on the feebate scheme class. The optimal feebates for inequality reduction have the highest
pivot points, impose high taxes (between e506 and e885 per g/km) on few car models and
provide low rebates for almost all cars (the rebate rates are between e2 and e8 per g/km).
There is also little room to increase French profits: they could be improved by at most 0.5%
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with a uniform feebate. Such a feebate scheme has a very low pivot point, giving few but
significant rebates and taxing almost all car models. The potential gains are even lower when
the objective is to improve the weighted average profits (the weights are inversely proportional
to the manufacturers’ market shares, giving Renault more importance than PSA). There are
significant potential gains from reducing the profit difference between Renault and PSA using
the feebates with the lowest pivot points, very high rebates for two car models and taxes on
all other models. These are clearly very different from the feebate schemes that improve the
French car manufacturers’ profits, indicating that the reduction of inequalities comes at the
expense of overall profit losses.
The average emissions of NOX and PM could be further limited. The potential gains are
equal to 2.6% for the average NOX emissions and 3.5% for PM emissions using uniform feebate
schemes. Still, these gains are multiplied by 1.5 to 1.6 with diesel-penalizing feebate schemes.
The different emissions weights do not qualitatively change the results, and the emissions
concentration weights imply slightly larger potential NOX and PM emissions reductions
than the average car emissions weights. The emissions are most limited using feebates with
relatively low pivot points (111 to 115 g/km), taxing approximately 98% of the car models.
There is one exception for the second class of feebate scheme, which achieves the largest
limitation of NOX emissions with a pivot point equal to 148 and relatively homogeneous
tax and rebate rates (e20 g/km for the tax rate and e61 g/km for the rebate rate). The
potential gains in limiting the simple weighted average emissions of CO and HC are much
more modest. They are below 1% for both pollutants and the two types of weights under
uniform feebates. The gains are even smaller or disappear with diesel-penalizing feebates.
Diesel-penalizing feebate schemes indeed discourage the purchase of diesel cars, which have
low CO and HC emissions.
If the objective is to reduce emissions in the municipalities where they are highest, the
potential gains are heterogeneous across feebate schemes and pollutants. The potential gains
are the most extensive for HC emissions under feebates that provide zero rebates to diesel cars
(17.5%). Such improvements are also relatively significant for CO emissions under uniform
feebates (11.5%) but are very small for NOX and PM emissions (at most 1.1% and 1.3%,
respectively). There are potential gains in terms of inequality reduction for all pollutants.
For instance, the current feebate achieves 42% of the maximum decrease in the difference
between the lowest and highest levels of HC emissions. The performance is better for NOX
and PM emissions, for which the current feebate scheme achieves approximately 75% and
65% of the potential optimal inequality reductions, respectively. The feebate schemes that
decrease inequalities are the same for most pollutants: the pivot points are minimum (89
or 105 g/km), the tax rates are low (e8 or e13), and the rebate rates are very high. Such
a feebate scheme is, in contrast, never optimal for improving consumer surplus, indicating
that the reduction in emissions inequality would come at the cost of a decrease in consumer
surplus.
Unsurprisingly, the results for the share of diesel closely follow those for the reduction of
NOX and PM emissions. Some feebate schemes can reduce the percentage of diesel cars, with
potential improvements between 3 and 5% of the optimal outcome. As expected, the gains
are more significant with diesel-penalizing feebate schemes, particularly those that grant no
rebates to diesel cars. These particular feebate parameters are not too different from the
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actual parameters (a pivot point of 148 to 150 g/km versus a neutral zone between 130 and
160 g/km for the actual feebate), except that the actual feebate does not discriminate by fuel
type. In summary, the optimal feebates are heterogeneous across outcomes and objectives,
revealing that a regulator would have arbitrage between the different objectives and outcomes
to select the optimal regulation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I quantify both the direct and indirect effects of the feebate policy and
find that it increases global welfare. Consumers are worse off when they are taxed to
subsidise the policy cost, but their loss is more than offset by an increase in the profits
of French manufacturers. With a uniform tax rate, the feebate appears to favour the
middle-income class, while it is progressive with a tax that is proportional to income. The
policy decreases average CO2 emissions by 2.2 g/km but increases average emissions of NOX
and PM, the most hazardous air pollutants. Emissions of local pollutants increase most
where they are initially lowest, namely, in rich and dense municipalities, achieving more
redistribution from rich to modest individuals. These rich and urban municipalities are
those where air emissions concentrations are highest, revealing a pervasive effect of the
feebate. Finally, the implemented feebate scheme achieves almost all of the maximum
potential consumer surplus and French car manufacturer profits. The inequalities across
individuals and French car manufacturers could be reduced, but this would come at the
cost of global welfare losses. Alternative feebate schemes could further limit NOX and PM
emissions, especially using diesel-penalising ones. However, such diesel-penalising feebates
would increase emissions of CO and HC and decrease consumer surplus, indicating trade-offs
across pollutants and objectives. An optimal feebate scheme design would require specifying
the regulator’s objective and the weights associated with each outcome, which I leave for
future research.
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Table 8: Potential gains from optimal linear feebates (in % of the optimal outcomes)
Objective Feebate Simple Weighted Weighted Min Range
Outcome scheme average average 1 average 2 or max Max - min
CS (1) 0.035 0.023 0.397 10.67
(146/19/21) (144/17/24) (121/8/180) (217/833/2)
(2) -0.312 -0.505 0.264 11.75
(159/33/37) (158/32/39) (136/12/114) (216/885/8)
(3) -0.006 -0.074 0.442 10.91
(147/12/32) (145/11/35) (123/5/181) (217/506/4)
Fr. Profits (1) 0.499 0.241 0.281 12.13
(119/8/268) (147/20/20) (89/8/24,165)
(2) -0.241 -0.707 -0.665 11.76
(112/7/1,270) (188/124/15) (205/321/10) (105/13/26,829)
(3) 0.262 -0.084 0.08 12.78
(119/5/329) (160/20/18) (160/20/18) (89/5/48,455)
NOX (1) 2.63 2.65 3.19 0.696 24.57
(115/7/512) (114/7/601) (89/8/24,165)
(2) 4.42 4.39 5.44 1.1 -3.16
(148/20/61) (112/7/1,270) (111/7/1,773) (147/20/64) (130/10/162)
(3) 4.28 4.22 5.15 1.11 22.29
(113/4/904) (89/5/48,455)
PM (1) 3.47 3.54 3.66 0.884 34.69
(115/7/512) (89/8/24,165)
(2) 5.56 5.65 5.86 1.05 -5.12
(111/7/1,773) (152/24/50)
(3) 5.19 5.21 5.39 1.29 31.61
(113/4/904) (89/5/48,455)
CO (1) 0.795 0.982 0.811 11.49 26.32
(89/8/24,165)
(2) -2.12 -1.91 -1.66 -2.21 -3.42
(108/13/6,659) (139/14/97) (137/13/108)
(3) -0.082 0.165 0.035 10.29 24.55
(104/6/2,944) (89/5/48,455)
HC (1) 0.855 1 0.856 10.39 29.99
(89/8/24,165)
(2) 0.211 0.254 0.089 17.5 58.34
(105/13/26,829)
(3) 0.133 0.332 0.208 9.24 26.96
(107/6/2,450) (89/5/48,455) (107/6/2,450) (89/5/48,455)
%Diesel (1) 2.99 2.99 0.788 25.71
(115/7/512) (114/7/601) (89/8/24,165)
(2) 5.25 5.09 1.25 -2.86
(150/22/55) (148/20/61) (147/20/64) (130/10/162)
(3) 4.95 4.84 1.26 23.37
(113/4/904) (113/4/904) (89/5/48,455)
Weights are inversely proportional to income for consumer surplus, inversely proportional to market share for
manufacturers’ profits, proportional to average emissions for the pollutants and proportional to the diesel share for
the diesel share reduction objective.“Min/Max” represents the minimum surplus and manufacturer profits and the
maximum average emissions levels and diesel share. Values in parentheses are the parameters of the optimal feebate
scheme and are, in order: pivot point/tax rate/rebate rate. The grid search was conducted over 129 pivot points
between 89 and 217 g/km for the feebate schemes (1) and (3) and over 112 pivot points between 105 and 216 g/km
for the feebate scheme (2); with an increment of 1 g/km.
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Français d’Automobiles. See https: // ccfa. fr/ .
36
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A Predicting emissions
A.1 Data and reduced form equation for local pollutant emissions
Here, I provide details on the data and the reduced form model used to predict emissions of
local pollutants for car models in 2008. The first dataset comes from the French Energy
Agency (ADEME) and provides information on the emissions levels for all car models
sold in France from 2012 to 2015.15 The second dataset comes from the UK Vehicle
Certification Agency and provides the emissions levels for the car models sold in the UK
over the period 2000-2018. In the two datasets, the emissions levels of NOX, PM, CO and
HC, are measured with driving cycle tests. The ADEME dataset contains information on the
main car characteristics: fuel type, body style, horsepower, weight and CO2 emissions. The
UK data, in contrast, provide much less information: fuel type, CO2 emissions and cylinder
capacity. I use a simple model to predict the values of the emissions of local pollutants for
CCFA car models sold in 2008 based on the observable car characteristics and estimated
from the combination of the ADEME and UK data. First, I exclude car models (i.e., model
names) that are not in the CCFA dataset. The combination of the ADEME and UK samples
provides 48,908 observations. The ADEME data account for 27.2% of the final sample, while
the UK data account for 72.8%. Unfortunately, emissions are not reported for all pollutants,
so the regressions use fewer than the total number of observations.
I regress the emissions on the main car characteristics: horsepower, weight, CO2 emissions,
and body style. I allow these characteristics to have differentiated effects depending on the
type of fuel. I include fuel-specific year fixed effects, except for PM emissions, since I do not
observe PM emissions for gasoline cars in the UK data. I also use the emissions standards of
all pollutants as controls; these regressors capture trade-offs between the different emissions.
I provide details on Euro emissions standards by year and fuel type in Table 9 below. I
introduce a sample dummy (UK or ADEME) and model name fixed effects. To predict
emissions for the car models that are not present in the ADEME or UK dataset, I use the
average of the model fixed effects by segment. I estimate a model fixed effect for 73% to 89%
of the car models in the CCFA dataset, depending on the pollutant.
I estimate the prediction models for CO, NOX, PM, and HC separately because the missing
values are not uniform across pollutants. I also estimate the same reduced-form equation
for CO2 emissions and test the external validity of the prediction model by comparing the
observed and predicted values. The parameter estimates are displayed in Table 10. Overall,
the observable car characteristics explain significant percentages of the variance in emissions,
and the R2 are between 0.511 (for CO) and 0.955 (for NOX).
15The data are not available before 2012, and ADEME stopped releasing publicly such data after 2015.
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Table 9: Emissions standards under Euro 2-Euro 6
Euro 2 Euro 3 Euro 4 Euro 5 Euro 6
(1997-2000) (2001-2005) (2006-2010) (2011-2014) (2015-2018)
Diesel NOX - 500 250 180 80
PM 800 500 250 50 45
CO 1000 640 500 500 500
HC+NOX 700 560 300 230 170
HC (inferred) 60 50 50 90
Gasoline NOX - 150 80 60 60
PM - - - 50 45
CO 2,200 2,200 1,000 1,000 1,000
HC - 200 100 100 100
Note: All emissions are in mg/km, except PM, in mg/10 km. For diesel cars, HC is not regulated per se, but there is a
limit on the total emissions of HC and NOX. I infer a hypothetical norm of HC from the difference between the norm on
HC+NOX and NOX. Under Euro 5, the PM emissions standard for gasoline cars applies to vehicles with direct injection
engines only. Since I cannot distinguish which vehicles have such engines, I consider all gasoline cars are subject to this
standard.
The effects of car characteristics depend on the fuel type and the pollutant. Horsepower is
positively correlated with emissions of most of the pollutants for both fuel types (except for
PM and CO for gasoline engines). At the same time, weight is negatively related to emissions
(except for PM and diesel cars). The correlation between emissions of local pollutants
and CO2 emissions is heterogeneous across pollutants and fuel types. While there is a
negative association between CO2 emissions and CO and PM emissions for diesel cars, I
obtain positive correlations for the other pollutants and engine types. The body types (wagon
and convertible) have less explanatory power. Both wagon and convertible are significant
for NOX and diesel vehicles, while for CO and HC, only the variable convertible interacted
with gasoline is significant. The high correlation that exists between car attributes probably
explains these differences. Finally, the parameters of the diesel dummies indicate that diesel
cars emit on average more NOX, PM and CO but less HC than gasoline cars. The coefficients
of emissions standards are significant. The emissions standards of the dependent pollutant
always positively affect emissions, while the standards for the other pollutants have different
signs. For instance, the standard for NOX is negatively correlated with PM, CO and HC but
positively correlated with CO2. The standard for HC is negatively associated with NOX, PM
and CO2, reflecting the trade-off among pollutants. Time trends are also negative and appear
differentiated by the type of fuel. They are also steeper for diesel cars than for gasoline cars
for NOX and CO.
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Table 10: Regression of emissions of local pollutants on car characteristics
NOX PM CO HC CO2

































































































































































































No. observations 42,767 13,847 48,646 44,066 48,908
R2 0.955 0.849 0.511 0.697 0.862
Note: NOX, CO and HC are in mg/km, PM is in mg/10 km, and CO2 is in g/km. All the regressions
include model name and fuel-specific year fixed effects. For parsimony, I present the average fuel-
specific time trends only. The year fixed effects are constrained to be identical across fuel types for
PM. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of versions of the model name in the year
in the sample (UK or ADEME). Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
A.2 Predicted emissions
Table 11 presents the observed and predicted emissions in France and the UK. Overall the
predictions are in line with the observed emissions levels by fuel type. Predicted emissions
levels in 2008 are higher than the observed average in 2012-2015, except for HC and CO
and only for diesel cars. The HC and CO average predicted values are nevertheless very
close to the 2008 average for the UK, which is reassuring. Finally, I find that the model
predicts levels of CO2 emissions that are very close to the observed emissions: the predicted
averages are 2.7% and 2.1% higher than the observed emissions for gasoline and diesel cars,
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respectively.
Table 11: Average emissions of pollutants by fuel type
2012-2015 2008
FR UK FR FR UK
(obs.) (obs.) (pred.) (obs.) (obs.)
Gasoline NOX 22.94 24.12 24.4 24.61
PM 18.08 24.21
CO 382 373 413 406
HC 41.92 42.1 49.32 48.44
CO2 167.6 166 190.6 185.6 208
Diesel NOX 134.9 132.4 198.3 197.7
PM 12.02 27.58 90.03 108.5
CO 231.6 224.3 155.8 147.4
HC 26.62 25.84 23.03 22.11
CO2 140.5 142.5 166.3 162.9 172.7
Note: NOX, CO and HC are in mg/km, PM is in mg/10 km, and CO2 is in
g/km. Unweighted average emissions of the car models in the UK data, ADEME
data (French sample, 2012-2015) and CCFA data (French sample, 2008).
Table 12 below presents the correlation between the levels of emission of the different
pollutants. The correlation matrix shows that the local pollutants are highly correlated with
each other. There are two groups of pollutants: NOX and PM, with a correlation coefficient
of 0.71, and CO and HC, with a correlation coefficient of 0.86. However, the pollutants of the
two groups are negatively and highly correlated: the correlation coefficients between NOX
and CO and HC are -0.86 and -0.9, respectively. These correlations are primarily driven by
the fuel type, as we observe much weaker and different correlation signs across pollutants
within fuel types.
Table 12: Correlations between the observed emissions of CO2 and predicted emissions of
CO, NOX, HC and PM in 2008
All cars Gasoline Diesel
NOX PM CO HC NOX PM CO HC NOX PM CO HC
CO2 -0.23 -0.18 0.17 0.26 0.17 0.07 -0.17 0.17 0.3 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
NOX 0.71 -0.86 -0.9 0.07 -0.03 0.45 0.06 0.11 0.26
PM -0.6 -0.66 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.05
CO 0.86 0.27 0.47
A.3 Outside option emissions
Because the feebate is likely to stimulate new car sales, I account for the environmental
benefits of replacing old cars with newer ones. I need to estimate the emissions associated
with the outside option. This option comprises heterogeneous underlying decisions such as
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keeping an old car, buying a car on the second-hand market and using public transport.
According to the CCFA, 82.7% of households owned a car in 2008, and the average car
vintage was eight years old. Subtracting the share of new car owners, I find that 79.2%
of those choosing the outside option are households that keep their old car, while 20.8%
are households without a car. The households without a vehicle are assumed to have zero
emissions. I predict the emissions of an average 8-year-old car by extrapolating fuel-specific
time trends. I regress the emissions of car purchases on time trends over 2003-2007 for
gasoline and diesel cars separately.16 I also predict the share of diesel in 2000 using the same
strategy. Table 13 below shows the average emissions of an 8-year-old car by fuel type and
the implied average emissions of the outside option. As expected, the average 8-year-old
vehicle is much more polluting than a new car. The outside option CO2 and NOXemissions
are nevertheless lower than those of an average new car in 2008 because the outside option
includes non-drivers. This is not the case for PM: the outside option emissions are 60%
higher than emissions from new vehicles in 2008.
Table 13: Average emissions from the outside option
CO2 NOX PM CO HC
Gasoline, 8-year-old 168.5 141.8 100.7 464.2 126
Diesel, 8-year-old 153.9 196 167 200.7 22.6
Average 8-year-old car 160 173.5 139.5 310.2 65.6
Outside option 126.7 137.4 110.4 245.6 51.9
Average car 2008 138.6 147.4 68.9 243.4 32.1
Note: CO2 is in g/km, NOX, CO and HC are in mg/km, PM is in mg/10 km.
B Emissions concentrations
I use data on average annual concentrations of PM10, NO2, C6H6 and CO from measurement
stations over the period 2010-2019. The data are open-source, and the main source is the
European Environment Agency (EEA), complemented with data from French regional air
quality monitoring agencies (part of the ATMO network, see ATMO). The EEA dataset
contains annual emissions concentrations for 598 measurement stations over 2012-2018.
For each measurement station, I assign the municipality using the longitude and latitude
coordinates. I supplement these data with the ATMO data provided by each regional
agency to increase the period covered and the number of measurement stations. Finally,
I merge the emissions concentrations with the dataset on household characteristics at the
municipality level. The final sample covers 640 measurement stations with different coverage
levels depending on the pollutant, as Table 14 shows. This table also presents descriptive
statistics for the observed and predicted emissions concentrations. I predict the emissions
concentrations from the observable characteristics of the municipalities. More precisely, I
regress the logarithm of the concentrations on the median income and income squared, a trend
and eight dummies for population density. I include the shares of households by household
size and professional activity and county (“départements”) fixed effects for PM10 and NO2.
16I exclude 2008 because the implementation of the feebate policy introduces a discontinuity in the trend.
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I do not include these controls for C6H6 and CO because there are too few observations
(355 and 207, respectively). The parameter estimates of these regressions are presented in
Table 15. The R2 of the regressions are relatively high for NO2 and PM10 (0.55 and 0.56,
respectively), but they are lower for C6H6 and CO (0.21 and 0.26). Income and household
sizes are proxies for the unobserved economic activity of the municipality, so their parameter
estimates are not relevant to interpret. However, I expect more correlation between the
population density and the professional activities and the emissions concentrations. I find
that the share of executives has the highest positive correlation with the concentrations
of PM10 and NO2. In contrast, the shares of farmers and manual labourers are negatively
associated with emissions concentrations. The population density dummies are only significant
for NO2, and they increase with population density, as expected. Finally, I obtain significant
negative trends for all pollutants, reflecting an annual decrease by 2.8% to 4.9%, depending
on the pollutant.
Table 14: Observed and predicted concentration of emissions of pollutants
No. No. Observed Predicted
municipalities stations Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
PM10 (µg/m3) 342 480 21.8 5.15 57.9 24.5 0.093 51.3
NO2 (µg/m
3) 356 548 29.3 0.484 85.8 26.8 2.52 185
Benzene (C6H6, µg/m
3) 101 137 1.4 0.33 9.79 1.73 0.001 2.65
CO (mg/m3) 57 65 0.374 0.1 1.1 0.359 0 0.695
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Table 15: Parameter estimates of the regression of air emissions concentration on
municipality characteristics
PM10 NO2 C6H6 CO
Param. Std. err. Param. Std. err. Param. Std. err. Param. Std. err.
Income 0.35† 0.18 -0.75∗∗ 0.23 3.4∗∗ 0.92 2.4† 1.4
Income2 -0.22∗∗ 0.044 0.12∗∗ 0.039 -0.83∗∗ 0.28 -0.7 0.43
Couple 0.62∗ 0.3 -0.86 0.53
Family 0.55∗∗ 0.15 -0.69∗∗ 0.24
Farmer -5.6∗∗ 2 -2 3.7
Entrepreneur -0.35 0.99 -2.8 1.7
Executive 1.4∗∗ 0.41 3.6∗∗ 0.72
Intermediate -0.053 0.49 1.7∗ 0.79
Employee -0.74† 0.41 1.5∗ 0.67
Manual laborer -1.5∗∗ 0.35 -0.014 0.63
Retired -0.8∗∗ 0.21 0.41 0.36
Trend -0.035∗∗ 0.002 -0.028∗∗ 0.003 -0.04∗∗ 0.009 -0.048∗∗ 0.014
2,000-4,999 -0.013 0.08 0.19 0.14 -0.78 0.94 0.15 3.2
5,000-9,999 0.05 0.073 0.17 0.15 -0.47 0.96 0.95 3.3
10,000-19,999 -0.079 0.073 0.078 0.14 -0.59 0.93 0.22 3.2
20,000-49,000 0.023 0.068 0.25† 0.13 -0.57 0.92 0.48 3.2
50,000-99,999 0.035 0.068 0.19 0.13 -0.42 0.91 0.5 3.2
100,000-199,999 0.042 0.069 0.28∗ 0.13 -0.39 0.91 0.33 3.2
200,000-2×106 0.073 0.07 0.38∗∗ 0.14 -0.35 0.91 0.78 3.2
Paris area 0.094 0.11 1.4∗∗ 0.23 -0.14 0.91 1.1 3.2
Intercept 3.1∗∗ 0.24 3.5∗∗ 0.41 -2.6∗ 1.2 -3.6 3.4
No. obs. 2,296 2,701 355 207
R2 0.561 0.552 0.214 0.262
Note: The reference levels are singles, the socio-professional category “other” and municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants.
All emissions concentrations are in µg/m3 except CO is in mg/m3. All regressions are weighted by the municipality population
divided by the number of observations per municipality. Regressions for PM10 and NO2 include county (“département”) fixed
effects. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
C Calibration of the social costs of emissions
As explained in the main text, I assume that the social costs of emissions in a municipality are
functions of the initial pollution levels in the municipality. I calibrate different cost functions
by keeping constant the average national emissions cost. I match the weighted average cost
of emissions, using the municipality population sizes as weights to the value obtained with
the uniform costs suggested by the report of the DG MOVE (2014). Formally, I calibrate













where φm is the share of the households located in the municipality m. f is the function
I calibrate (linear, quadratic or discontinuous). The function argument ẽpm is the proxy
for pollution level (the initial average car emissions, the average estimated air emissions
concentrations or the population density). Finally, υpa(m) is the uniform cost of pollutant
p suggested by the report of the DG MOVE (2014). It is indexed by a(m), the type of
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area of the municipality, to account for heterogeneous costs of PM emissions across rural,
suburban and urban areas. Since multiple combinations of emissions cost parameters satisfy
this equation, I further impose τ pa to be identical across types of areas for NOX and HC. For
PM, I preserve the proportionality in the emissions costs suggested by the report of the DG
MOVE (2014).
These different functional forms imply important heterogeneity in emissions costs across
municipalities, as suggested in Table 16 below. The large ranges in air emissions concentrations,
as Table 14 reveals, mechanically imply large heterogeneity in emissions costs under the linear
and quadratic specifications. The population density is very heterogeneous throughout the
country; this implies large ranges for emissions costs with a maximum of around e7 million
for a ton of PM under the quadratic specification. Under discontinuous cost functions, a
fraction of municipalities have zero emissions costs, and this fraction is heterogeneous across
pollutants and specifications. 50% of the population lives in 3.5% of the municipalities;
this implies that 96.5% of the municipalities have zero emissions cost for all pollutants under
the discontinuous specifications using the population density. Under the other specifications,
there is also important heterogeneity across pollutants and specifications. When I use average
car emissions, 11% of municipalities have a positive NOX emissions cost; this percentage is
equal to 77% when I use average emissions concentrations. I obtain the same pattern for
PM emissions: 23% municipalities have a positive cost when I use car emissions versus 77%
when I rely on air emissions concentrations). But I find the reverse for HC emissions: 81%
of municipalities have a positive cost when I use car emissions, while only 23% do when I use
air emissions concentrations. These 12 different specifications provide various cost estimates
that I later use to check how much the total emissions cost increases when I account for
potentially increasing returns to scale in emissions costs.
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Table 16: Heterogeneity in municipality emissions costs
Cost of NOX Cost of PM Cost of HC
Uniform 13,052 33,303/64,555/211,795∗ 1,695
Min Max Std. Min Max Std. Min Max Std.
dev. dev. dev.
Function of average car emissions
Linear 4,720 15,873 816 15,498 260,264 36,631 1,433 2,428 73
Quadratic 1,690 19,115 1,609 7,122 315,822 36,703 1,205 3,461 145
Disc-unif. 0 26,067 10,957 0 627,750 76,770 0 3,386 1,428
Disc-linear 0 29,673 11,045 0 699,272 76,951 0 4,636 1,399
Function of average air emissions concentrations
Linear 1,225 89,899 3,370 115 402,820 39,637 1.4 2,599 461
Quadratic 59 315,965 5,858 0.4 715,853 42,411 0 3,685 947
Disc-unif. 0 26,095 8,189 0 317,469 58,353 0 3,389 1,335
Disc-linear 0 119,350 5,944 0 536,899 55,831 0 4,226 1,504
Function of population density
Linear 1 240,429 4,718 1.5 2,237,765 42,422 0.1 31,223 613
Quadratic 0 849,083 8,274 0 7,040,416 68,371 0 110,266 1,075
Disc-unif. 0 26,092 4,794 0 292,099 41,951 0 3,388 623
Disc-linear 0 249,949 4,915 0 2,277,366 43,156 0 32,460 638
Note: in e/ton of emissions. ∗: costs for PM in rural/suburban/urban areas.
D Additional Tables and Figures
D.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 17 and 18 present the results of the descriptive regressions to empirically investigate
how car manufacturers reacted to the feebate policy in 2008. Table 17 estimates the pass-
through rate of the feebate to buyers. The parameter estimate suggests that 57.6% of
the rebate or fee was passed through to buyers on average. Table 18 investigates whether
French car manufacturers anticipated the feebate scheme and modified the CO2 emission
levels to maximise rebates. The coefficient of interest is the interaction between the French
manufacturer dummy and the year 2008. If the coefficient was negative and significant,
it could indicate that French manufacturers anticipated the policy. The parameter is not
significant and positive, and this finding is robust to allowing the interaction coefficient to
be car manufacturer-specific. In addition, these regressions indicate that the French car
manufacturers typically produce cars with much lower CO2 emissions than their foreign
competitors. The coefficient of the French dummy implies that French car manufacturers
produce cars with CO2 emissions that are 23.2 g/km lower than those produced by foreign
car manufacturers. This suggests that French car manufacturers may benefit more from the
feebate policy than foreign car manufacturers.
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Table 17: Regression of the net car price on the rebate/fee and controls
Price Parameter Std. error
Rebate -0.576∗∗ 0.122
Fuel cost -234∗∗ 67.9
Horsepower 1287∗∗ 57.7
Cylinder capacity 168∗∗ 29.9
Weight 1312∗∗ 122
Coupe/convertible 2,594∗∗ 228







No. of observations 5,028
R2 0.979
Note: The regression includes car model fixed effects. The
price and rebate are in e, the horsepower is the fiscal
horsepower, the fuel cost is in e/100 km, the cylinder capacity
is in 1,000 cm3, and the weight is in 100 kg. The rebate is
positive for a rebate and negative for a fee. Significance levels:
†: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
Table 18: Regression of CO2 emissions on year and car manufacturer origin dummies
Parameter Std.err. Parameter Std.err.
2004 -3.64 2.37 -3.63 2.37
2005 -6.17∗∗ 2.34 -6.19∗∗ 2.34
2006 -7.53∗∗ 2.33 -7.55∗∗ 2.32
2007 -10.51∗∗ 2.3 -10.51∗∗ 2.3
2008 -18.33∗∗ 2.39 -18.33∗∗ 2.39
French -23.22∗∗ 1.9
French × 2008 6.58 4.25
Intercept 193.97∗∗ 1.74 193.98∗∗ 1.74
Renault -19.04∗∗ 2.96
PSA -25.66∗∗ 2.32
Renault × 2008 4.41 6.33
PSA × 2008 7.62 5.3
Note: CO2 emissions are in g/km. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
Table 19 shows the average demographic characteristics for all municipalities and the
sample of 3,000 municipalities used for the estimation. The sample is representative of the
entire country. Urban and very urban areas are over-represented relative to rural areas, a
direct consequence of drawing with weights proportional to the number of households. The
49
sample of 3,000 municipalities shows significant variation in demographic characteristics,
which is crucial for identifying heterogeneity parameters. For instance, the median income
is between approximately e6,000 and e44,000. Income varies across municipalities and over
time, while the other demographic characteristics are fixed over time. The frequencies of
household sizes are heterogeneous in the sample, with variations from 7% to between 53%
and 67%.
Table 19: Descriptive statistics for the full sample and the sample of 3,000 municipalities
Full sample Sample of 3,000 municipalities
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
No. of households 18,347 30,547 15 194,661 20,378 31,373 49 173,887
Income 17,200 3,918 5,601 50,696 17,334 4,010 6,411 43,849
Household size
Single 0.35 0.11 0 0.75 0.36 0.11 0.091 0.67
Couple 0.28 0.061 0 0.71 0.27 0.056 0.14 0.53
Family 0.37 0.089 0.041 0.78 0.37 0.086 0.071 0.67
Professional activity
Farmer 0.0095 0.021 0 0.52 0.0052 0.011 0 0.26
Entrepreneur 0.033 0.015 0 0.39 0.031 0.012 0 0.2
Executive 0.086 0.064 0 0.36 0.088 0.064 0 0.36
Intermediate 0.14 0.038 0 0.41 0.14 0.034 0 0.31
Employee 0.17 0.033 0 0.71 0.17 0.032 0 0.44
Manual laborer 0.14 0.054 0 0.57 0.13 0.05 0 0.39
Retired 0.26 0.074 0 0.76 0.26 0.07 0.053 0.65
Other activity 0.17 0.05 0 0.57 0.18 0.045 0 0.41
Municipality size
Rural 0.43 0.5 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1
Urban 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.22 0.41 0 1
Very urban 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.45 0.5 0 1
Note: The statistics are weighted by the number of households.
D.2 Additional estimation results
Table 20 provides the influence matrix for micro-moments and parameters of heterogeneity.
This table reveals which moments are most crucial for parameter identification. Most of the
time, the largest influence comes from moments constructed from the covariance between
corresponding demographic and product characteristics. However, this is not the case for
the parameter of income interacted with fuel cost, which is most influenced by the covariance
between income and price. The parameter for urban area interacted with fuel cost is most
influenced by the micro-moment involving the interaction between the dummy for urban
area and fuel cost.
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Table 20: Influence matrix for heterogeneity parameters and micro-moments
Moment Income, Income, Urban, Urban, W/o children, Income Urban Couple
/parameter fuel cost price fuel cost weight cylinder
Income × fuel cost -0.372 1.03 0.047 -0.012 0.005 0.023 -0.076 0.037
Income × price 1.01 -3.49 -0.111 0.026 -0.009 -0.048 0.245 -0.097
Urban × fuel cost 0.078 -0.082 -0.541 0.312 0.021 -0.413 0.236 -0.28
Urban × weight -0.041 0.021 0.343 -0.225 -0.011 0.297 -0.167 0.201
W/o children × cylinder -0.005 -0.025 0.011 0.001 -0.507 0.145 -0.071 0.225
In Table 21 below, I provide the estimated cost parameters. They all have the expected
signs: it is more costly to produce powerful, fuel-efficient, heavy and high cylinder capacity
cars.
Table 21: Additional estimation results
Model w/o heterogeneity Model with heterogeneity
Parameter Std. err. Parameter Std. err.
Marginal cost parameters
Intercept -1.24∗∗ 0.053 -1.27∗∗ 0.037
Horsepower 0.052∗∗ 0.003 0.049∗∗ 0.003
Fuel consumption (L/100 km) -0.035∗∗ 0.003 -0.023∗∗ 0.003
Weight (100 kg) 0.131∗∗ 0.004 0.127∗∗ 0.002
Cylinder capacity (1,000 cm3) 0.005∗∗ 0.002 0.005∗∗ 0.002
Note: Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the price sensitivity coefficient in the population. 98%
of the population has a price sensitivity between -2.1 and -1.2, while the distribution’s mode
is -1.55. The distribution has a noticeable tail of price-sensitive consumers since 60% of the
population has a higher price sensitivity than the mode.
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Figure 3: Distribution of price sensitivities












Note: The kernel estimator of the density of price sensitivities uses a Gaussian kernel
for 31,588 municipalities in 2008 weighted by the number of households. The top and
bottom 1% are trimmed.
The feebate introduction may create econometric issues related to relying on non-stationary
car market share estimates. First, the policy was announced two months before its introduction,
leaving room for consumers to bring forward or postpone their car purchases. It is possible
that car sales only stabilise after a few months. I check the robustness of the estimated
parameters to the exclusion of the first few months of each year. I also consider the effect
of including December and January. Second, there may be a different anticipation effect
associated with the feebate policy: individuals may expect car manufacturers to produce too
many polluting cars relative to demand and expect sellers to get rid of their inventories at
low prices towards the end of the year. I check the robustness to this type of anticipation
effect by estimating the model using market shares calculated on a subset of months that
exclude the last few months of the years (from September to December). Finally, I estimate
the model without the year 2008.
All the estimation results are presented in Table 22 and reveal that the estimates are
reasonably robust to the exclusion of the first or last few months. When I exclude 2008, the
estimates present much less heterogeneity in fuel cost and price sensitivities. The parameter
for heterogeneity in price sensitivity becomes not significantly different from zero. This could
indicate a problem due to the non-stationarity of demand in 2008 or that the data have low
identification power without 2008 because of less variation in car prices. Because the results
remain very stable when I exclude the first or last months, I believe that the difference in
parameter estimates reflects that including 2008 provides useful variation in prices to identify
the heterogeneity parameters. I nevertheless use these parameters to check the robustness
of the estimates of the policy effect on car emissions, car sales, car manufacturer profits and
consumer surplus and find they are very similar.
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Table 22: Estimated demand parameters under alternative sample selections






















































































































































































































































No. observations 5,028 5,187 4,974 4,906 4,839 5,027 4,919 4,919 4,064
Note: (1): Main specification: December and January excluded, (2): all months, (3): December-February excluded, (4): December-
March excluded, (5): December-April excluded, (6): November and December excluded, (7) October-December excluded, (8): September-
December excluded, and (9): December and January excluded, 2008 excluded. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
D.3 Additional results on the aggregate feebate policy’s effects
Table 23 presents the difference between the observed and predicted outcomes in 2008 under
the feebate policy. The observed outcomes are based on the market shares calculated using
the registrations over February-November of the car models in my choice set (from the
CCFA). The simulated outcomes rely on the equilibrium model, the parameters of preferences
and the car marginal costs. I consider two car marginal costs that I obtain from (i) the entire
sample of municipalities (benchmark outcomes) and (ii) the sample of 3,000 municipalities
(alternative outcomes). First, the method to recover the car marginal costs has minimal
impact on the predicted outcomes. Secondly, the predicted car sales and profits are very
close to the observed sales and profits. There are minor budget cost differences of e5.5 and
e6.9 million, which correspond to only 2.5% and 3.2% of the budget cost.
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Table 23: Difference between observed and predicted aggregate outcomes
Observed Simulated Simulated
(benchmark) (alternative)
Total sales (1,000 units) 1,216 1,223 1,215
Share of diesel (%) 71.92 70.97 71.11
Profits French (Me) 4,354 4,322 4,289
Profits all (Me) 7,610 7,645 7,598
Budget cost (Me) -217.1 -211.6 -210.1
Note: “Me” stands for millions of euros.“ Observed” profits are calculated using observed market
shares and estimated margins. “Benchmark” outcomes are predicted from marginal costs obtained
from the full sample of municipalities while “alternative” outcomes are based on the marginal costs
estimated from the sample of 3,000 municipalities.
In Table 24 below, I provide the average pass-through rates for each class of CO2 emissions;
all are close to 100%. They are nevertheless heterogeneous across vehicle classes. The
average pass-through rate is below 100% for class C+, implying that car manufacturers
absorb fractions of the rebates for this car category. For classes A and B, the prices decrease
by more than the rebate amount on average. Class E+ has the largest pass-through, reaching
104% of the fee. The overshifting of the tax reveals that the feebate softens competition for
cars in this class. The feebate allows car manufacturers to increase their margins by e8 on
average.
Table 24: Average feebate pass-through by emissions class
Class Fee ∆p Pass-through
of emissions (e) (e) rate (%)
A -1,000 -1,015 101.52
B -700 -706.7 100.95
C+ -200 -198.4 99.18
C-/D 0 4.67
E+ 200 208.1 104.05
E- 750 768.3 102.44
F 1,600 1,631 101.91
G 2,600 2,642 101.62
Note: “∆p” is the average difference in net prices paid by
consumers. The pass-through rate is ∆p divided by the fee
or rebate.
Table 25 presents the distribution of households according to car ownership status under
and in the absence of the feebate policy depending on the assumption on the origin of
extra car sales. Under the benchmark assumption, the proportion of non-motorised and
old car-owning households is constant with and without the feebate. This implies that
the fraction of old car owners decreases by 0.2 percentage points, and the fraction of non-
motorised households decreases by 0.1 percentage points because of the feebate. The share of
households with an old car in the absence of the feebate policy is largest under the optimistic
scenario (66%) because the extra sales are assumed to be due to old car replacements. Under
54
scenario (3), the share of households holding an old car is constant with and without the
policy because the extra new car sales are supposed to be new drivers.
Table 25: Frequency of households according to their ownership status
Feebate No feebate
Scenario (1) (2) (3)
Benchmark Optimistic Pessimistic
New car 16.9 16.6 16.6 16.6
No car 17.3 17.4 17.4 17.6
Old car 65.8 66 66 65.8
- diesel 38.4 38.6 38.6 38.4
- gasoline 27.3 27.4 27.4 27.3
Note: in %. (1): benchmark, (2): old car replacement, and (3): new drivers.
The total cost of emissions of local pollutants relies on estimates provided by the report of
the DG MOVE (2014), which are uniform across locations except for PM emissions. Table 26
presents the monetary value of extra or avoided emissions of local pollutants depending on the
assumption about the social costs of the emissions. Overall, the total costs of emissions are
not so different from one specification to another, indicating that emissions do not increase
too much where they are the costliest.
Table 26: Effects of the feebate policy on the cost of emissions of local pollutants
New cars Outside option Total
NOX PM HC NOX PM HC cars Outside Net
option balance
Benchmark, uniform 0.945 0.344 0.019 -0.602 -0.399 -0.023 1.31 -1.02 0.284
Function of average car emissions
Rob. 1: linear 0.938 0.34 0.019 -0.595 -0.392 -0.023 1.3 -1.01 0.286
Rob. 2: quadratic 0.932 0.337 0.019 -0.59 -0.386 -0.023 1.29 -0.999 0.289
Rob. 3: discontinuous 0.932 0.328 0.019 -0.576 -0.355 -0.024 1.28 -0.956 0.323
Rob. 4: discontinuous & linear 0.93 0.327 0.019 -0.575 -0.353 -0.024 1.28 -0.952 0.324
Function of average air concentrations
Rob. 5: linear 0.9 0.333 0.019 -0.595 -0.392 -0.023 1.25 -1.01 0.242
Rob. 6: quadratic 0.813 0.322 0.02 -0.59 -0.386 -0.023 1.16 -0.999 0.156
Rob. 7: discontinuous 0.915 0.324 0.02 -0.576 -0.355 -0.024 1.26 -0.956 0.304
Rob. 8: discontinuous & linear 0.876 0.319 0.02 -0.575 -0.353 -0.024 1.21 -0.952 0.262
Function of population density
Rob. 9: linear 0.854 0.306 0.018 -0.594 -0.392 -0.023 1.18 -1.01 0.169
Rob. 10: quadratic 0.794 0.284 0.017 -0.59 -0.388 -0.023 1.1 -1 0.094
Rob. 11: discontinuous 0.878 0.324 0.018 -0.577 -0.386 -0.022 1.22 -0.986 0.235
Rob. 12: discontinuous & linear 0.849 0.304 0.018 -0.593 -0.391 -0.023 1.17 -1.01 0.164
Note: All costs are in millions of euros.
D.4 Additional results on the distributional aspects of the feebate
The role of preferences. The feebate’s effect on individuals’ surplus is related to the
preference heterogeneity parameters through different channels. First, they determine the
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baseline level of consumer surplus, which mechanically affects the variation in consumer
surplus in percentage. Consequently, the same increase in consumer surplus implies a larger
relative gain when the consumer surplus level is small, i.e., when the average utility of holding
a car is low. The price heterogeneity coefficient has a specific role because it appears in both
the numerator and the denominator of the consumer surplus formula. By differentiating
the consumer surplus function with respect to the price coefficient αm, I can show that
consumer surplus always increases with αm: the surplus associated with car purchase is high
when the price sensitivity (−αm) is low. My estimates suggest that the poorest households
have lower price sensitivity and are associated with higher surplus levels than higher-income
households. The other heterogeneity parameters positively impact consumer surplus if the
sign of the parameter of heterogeneity multiplied by the car characteristic is positive, which
is the case for income interacted with fuel cost and urban area interacted with fuel cost.
Understanding the effects of demographic characteristics on the variation in consumer
surplus from the feebate is more complicated. Intuitively, we expect consumers to gain
from the feebate if the cars consumers like become cheaper. For instance, we anticipate
consumers with high fuel cost sensitivity (in poor municipalities) to gain more from the
feebate than those who care less about fuel efficiency (in wealthy municipalities). The effect
of preference heterogeneity is less straightforward to predict for other car characteristics not
directly linked to the rebate or fee amount. Therefore, I empirically analyse each demographic
characteristic’s partial effect on the variation in consumer surplus in level and percentage. I
fix all demographic characteristics to their average national values except the one that affects
the parameter of heterogeneity of interest.
The results are provided in Table 27 below. First, income has two opposite effects on
the consumer surplus and the effect of the feebate policy through its link to fuel cost and
price sensitivities. Income decreases the gain from the feebate through fuel cost sensitivity,
as predicted. Through the price coefficient, the income effect has a non-monotonic effect
on welfare gains from the policy in levels but strictly raises the gains in relative terms.
There is tension in the net income effect between its fuel cost sensitivity and price sensitivity
channels. Richer consumers are more price-sensitive, so they gain more from the feebate, but
these consumers do not care about fuel efficiency gains as much as low-income consumers.
This is why the net income effect on the policy effect is non-monotonic in both absolute and
relative terms.
The type of area is associated with different signs for the absolute variation in surplus and
the relative variation. My results indicate that the average gain from the feebate is larger
in urban than rural areas when analysing the partial role of the type of area through the
preference for fuel cost. This is simply because urban areas are associated with a higher
surplus of holding a car since, in relative terms, those in rural areas (who care more about
fuel costs) gain more. The type of area has opposite effects through its link to the fuel cost
and weight sensitivity parameters. On the one hand, urban individuals are less sensitive to
fuel costs than those in rural areas, so they gain less from the feebate in relative terms. On
the other hand, urban consumers care less about the car size, so they are less hurt by the
feebate favouring small cars. This latter effect dominates since I obtain a higher relative gain
in urban areas than in rural areas. However, in absolute terms, the gain is higher in rural
areas than in urban areas, following the ranking for consumer surplus values.
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Finally, the valuation of cylinder capacity is lower for households without children, making
their feebate gains larger than those of families with children. The variation in consumer
surplus in percentage terms also increases with the share of households without children,
even though the level of consumer surplus decreases with this variable. These are only
partial effects of each demographic characteristic. While they provide intuitions about the
feebate’s impact at the individual level, given that the consumer surplus formula involves an
exponential, there are interactions between the different parameters of preferences. The net
effect of the feebate on individuals remains an empirical question.
Table 27: Effect of heterogeneity parameters on CS, ∆CS and ∆%CS
Parameter CS ∆CS ∆% CS
Income × fuel cost 0.227 ↑ ↓ ↓
Income × price -0.509 ↓ ↑ then ↓ ↑
Net effect of income ↑ ↑ then ↓ ↑ then ↓
Urban × fuel cost 0.035 ↑ ↑ ↓
Urban × weight -0.034 ↓ ↓ ↑
Net effect of urban ↓ ↓ ↑
%Without children × cylinder -0.537 ↓ ↑ then ↓ ↑
Heterogeneity across households. The analysis by income decile hides significant heterogeneity
in the effect of the policy for the highest income decile. The surplus variation increases
until approximately e29,000 and then decreases. Individuals with incomes between e18,000
and e38,000 are estimated to gain from the feebate under a uniform tax. High-income
individuals lose from the feebate regulation under both tax schemes. They lose more under
the proportional tax because their tax payment is greater than the uniform tax value. I find a
similar pattern for the distribution of the gains and losses in absolute terms. For the surplus
variation in level terms and under the uniform tax scenario, the losses for the low-income
categories are much lower, while under the proportional tax scenario, the surplus decreases
slightly more sharply than it does when we consider variation in surplus in percentage terms.
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Figure 4: Average consumer surplus variation and income















(a) Surplus variation in percentage terms





















(b) Surplus variation in level terms
Note: Income is in e10,000. Local polynomial regressions with 2nd order polynomials.
In the main text, I provide the average surplus variation by income deciles. However, the
income deciles are constructed from the distribution of the municipalities’ median incomes.
As a robustness check, I analyse the average surplus variation associated with the national
income distribution deciles, using the data from the National Survey Institute in 2008 (see
INSEE). I abstract from taxes to subsidise the cost of the policy for this robustness check.
Because the utility parameters also depend on the type of area, I compute the variation in
consumer surplus for each income decile for rural and urban areas separately. Lastly, because
the preference for cylinder capacity depends on the household size, I set the household
size to the national average, computed using the full sample of municipalities. The results
presented in Table 28 reveal that the income deciles based on municipalities’ median incomes
imply an income distribution that is flatter than the true national income distribution.
The third national income distribution decile is roughly equal to the eighth decile of my
constructed income distribution. The results nevertheless confirm the bell-shaped relation
between income and consumer surplus variation. By flattening the income distribution, the
income decile that I consider hides that the top two income deciles are made worse off by
the feebate policy. The variation in consumer surplus in percentage terms is close to that
obtained when I use the municipalities’ median income distribution deciles, except for the
three highest income deciles, which display either much lower gains or losses. The average
welfare loss reaches e166 for the highest income decile in urban areas. Still, this amount
represents a decrease of only 2.3% of the surplus because the surplus base value is also
large. The most significant gains in absolute terms are associated with the sixth income
decile (between e36,000 and e42,000); they are between e36.7 and e41.1 (depending on
the area). These figures are slightly higher than the average surplus increase for the top
decile of my constructed income distribution.
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Table 28: Average consumer surplus variation by national income decile
Income decile Urban Rural
level % level %
d1 13,830 19.5 2.55 22.2 2.45
d2 17,810 23.6 2.88 26.8 2.79
d3 21,780 28 3.05 31.6 2.98
d4 26,110 32.7 3.03 36.7 2.99
d5 30,720 36.5 2.73 40.8 2.74
d6 35,980 36.7 2.07 41.1 2.12
d7 42,010 25.4 1.01 29.6 1.1
d8 50,010 -19.4 -0.49 -15.1 -0.37
d9 63,950 -165.8 -2.3 -159.7 -2.19
Note: The second column provides the value of the income
decile. “Level” represents variations of average surplus in
levels (e), while “%” represents variations in relative terms,
using the consumer surplus value without a feebate as a
reference.
I correlate the effects of the feebate with other demographic characteristics through descriptive
regressions. I first regress the consumer surplus variation on the proportion of households in
each household size category and each socio-professional category. I then use all demographic
characteristics together. The results of the three specifications are displayed in Table 29. The
correlation between welfare gains and household size in Specification (1) suggests that couples
and families are associated with larger welfare gains than single individuals, in absolute terms.
However, in relative terms, couples and then single people gain the most. This result occurs
because single individuals are associated with a low surplus from buying a car; therefore, the
welfare gains appear greater in relative terms. The positive gains for couples with children
(families) in absolute terms are driven by their lower taste for cylinder capacity relative
to single people and couples, making families less hurt when substituting for rebated cars
with low cylinder capacities. Specification (2) correlates welfare benefits with the socio-
professional category. When I analyse the gains in absolute terms, the types of workers
associated with the largest gains are intermediate professionals, entrepreneurs and manual
labourers. Individuals in the high (executive) and medium socio-professional categories,
such as farmers and employees, are in contrast associated with lower absolute gains. When
we examine the gains in relative terms, the comparison across categories is very different:
entrepreneurs, farmers, intermediate professionals and manual labourers have the lowest
welfare gains, while executives’ gains are almost comparable to gains of retired individuals.
Finally, I find that household size has the same effect when using all demographics together,
including income, income squared, and population density. Still, the influence of the socio-
professional category is smaller, as expected, since the professional activity is not directly
linked to consumer preferences. The results show, as previously emphasised, a non-monotonic
correlation between income and welfare benefits of consumers. I find significantly lower
benefits in urban relative to rural municipalities (e1.3 less). However, in relative terms, the
gains appear to be largest for individuals living in the densest cities (+0.18% more than
gains in rural municipalities).
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Table 29: Regression of average consumer surplus variation on demographic characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
level % level % level %
Intercept -8.63∗∗ 0.85 6.19∗∗ 0.05 6.12∗∗ 1.94 7.97∗∗ 0.16 -38.9∗∗ 2.44 3.51∗∗ 0.07
%Couple 4.29∗∗ 0.28 0.08∗∗ 0.01 4.71∗∗ 0.28 0.1∗∗ 0.01
%Family 5.49∗∗ 0.26 -1∗∗ 0.01 4.42∗∗ 0.31 -1.01∗∗ 0.01
%Farmer 2.02∗∗ 0.5 -1.05∗∗ 0.04 -0.02 0.33 -0.02∗ 0.01
%Entrepreneur 8.02∗∗ 0.78 -1.32∗∗ 0.08 0.46 0.51 0.01 0.01
%Executive 2.16∗∗ 0.69 -0.15∗ 0.06 0.83∗ 0.4 0.03∗ 0.01
%Intermediate 8.79∗∗ 0.55 -1.07∗∗ 0.05 1.19∗∗ 0.35 -0.03∗∗ 0.01
%Employee 0.58 0.51 -0.68∗∗ 0.04 1.42∗∗ 0.28 0.04∗∗ 0.01
%Manual laborer 4.43∗∗ 0.33 -0.97∗∗ 0.03 2.26∗∗ 0.29 0.05∗∗ 0.01
%Other activity -3.65∗∗ 0.59 -0.41∗∗ 0.06 0.42 0.29 -0.02 0.01
Income 17∗∗ 2.35 2.32∗∗ 0.05
Income2 -1.99∗∗ 0.48 -0.5∗∗ 0.01
Urban -1.34∗∗ 0.22 0.14∗∗ 0.01
Very urban 0.52 0.33 0.18∗∗ 0.01
Note: The dependent variables are the average consumer surplus variation in both absolute terms and relative terms. Income is
divided by e10,000. “%” stands for the percentage of households in each category. Household sizes and professional activities
are in 10%. The reference category for household size is single, the reference category for the professional activity is retired, and
the reference category for the size of the municipality is rural (less than 20,000 inhabitants). The regressions are weighted by the
number of households in the municipalities in 2008. Significance levels: †: 10%, ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
Heterogeneity in emissions. I provide the distributions of the changes in emissions
stemming from the feebate policy. These are the distributions over individuals since each
municipality is weighted by the number of households. The different graphs presented in
Figure 5 reveal substantial heterogeneity across pollutants as well as across municipalities.
The average emissions of NOX and PM increase in all municipalities but with different
intensities. Similarly, emissions of CO and HC decrease in the majority of the municipalities
but increase in some, suggesting important heterogeneity.
Figure 5: Distribution of the variations in average emissions across municipalities











































(a) In percentage terms







































(b) In level terms
Note: The kernel estimators of the density of the variations of average pollutants use Gaussian kernels. I use
the 31,588 municipalities weighted by the number of households.
As a robustness check, I analyse whether emissions increase most where they are initially
highest, this time using variation in levels instead of in percentage terms. Figure 6 indicates
that the relations between changes in levels and the initial emissions are very similar when
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analysing the variations in emissions in levels or percentage terms.
Figure 6: Emissions variations (in levels) as function of initial emissions levels









































































(b) Average air emissions concentrations
Note: Local polynomial regressions using second-order polynomials. Average car emissions are in mg/km, except
PM emissions are in mg/10km. Concentrations of NO2, PM10 and C6H6 are in µg/m3. Concentrations of
CO are in mg/m3.
I provide more detailed figures on the change of emissions by grouping municipalities
according to their initial emissions and compute changes by emissions deciles. I consider
emissions deciles calculated from average car emissions in 2008 in the absence of the feebate.
I also analyse air emissions concentrations deciles which rely on the estimated average
municipality air emissions concentrations. As before, I weight each municipality by the
number of households to obtain the distribution of emissions across individuals. The results
are consistent with the figures and confirm that emissions increase most where car emissions
are initially lowest for NOX and PM while they decrease most where they are initially the
highest for CO and HC. However, when analysing the air emissions concentration deciles,
NOX emissions increase most in municipalities with high NO2, while CO and HC emissions
decrease least where they are initially high. For PM, there is minimal variation across
emissions concentration deciles.
Figure 7 presents the variation of the diesel share as function of the initial diesel share
of the municipality (represented by the percentage of diesel in 2008 in the absence of the
feebate policy) both in level and relative terms. The two graphs consistently reveal that
the diesel share increases most where it is initially the lowest: in urban and wealthy areas.
The diesel share is estimated to increase by approximately 5% at the lowest level, while the
increase is below 0.33% in places where the initial diesel share exceeds 80%.
D.5 Additional results on the feebate performance
Table 31 summarises the different outcomes of interest and objective functions used to define
optimal feebates. For the minimisation of average emissions, I rely on two different weights.
The first weights are proportional to the average levels of car emissions in 2008 with the
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Table 30: Average emissions variation by emission and air concentration decile
∆NOX ∆PM ∆CO ∆HC
level % level % level % level %
Initial car emissions deciles
≤ d1 1.4 1.4 0.43 0.82 0.09 0.043 0.005 0.018
d1-d2 0.92 0.68 0.3 0.47 -0.071 -0.031 -0.015 -0.049
d2-d3 0.81 0.58 0.27 0.41 -0.18 -0.08 -0.029 -0.092
d3-d4 0.73 0.51 0.24 0.36 -0.26 -0.11 -0.039 -0.12
d4-d5 0.67 0.46 0.23 0.33 -0.35 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16
d5-d6 0.62 0.41 0.21 0.31 -0.45 -0.18 -0.062 -0.19
d6-d7 0.57 0.38 0.2 0.28 -0.55 -0.22 -0.075 -0.23
d7-d8 0.53 0.34 0.19 0.26 -0.7 -0.27 -0.092 -0.28
d8-d9 0.48 0.3 0.17 0.23 -0.88 -0.33 -0.12 -0.34
d9-d10 0.41 0.25 0.15 0.19 -1.7 -0.58 -0.21 -0.57
Air emissions concentrations deciles
≤ d1 0.6 0.41 0.25 0.43 -0.83 -0.29 -0.072 -0.19
d1-d2 0.58 0.38 0.23 0.35 -0.21 -0.085 -0.066 -0.19
d2-d3 0.61 0.41 0.23 0.34 -0.41 -0.15 -0.062 -0.18
d3-d4 0.63 0.43 0.24 0.35 -0.42 -0.16 -0.076 -0.22
d4-d5 0.67 0.46 0.24 0.37 -0.63 -0.23 -0.073 -0.22
d5-d6 0.63 0.43 0.24 0.35 -0.47 -0.18 -0.091 -0.27
d6-d7 0.75 0.54 0.24 0.35 -0.75 -0.28 -0.1 -0.3
d7-d8 0.81 0.6 0.24 0.37 -0.56 -0.22 -0.052 -0.16
d8-d9 0.82 0.61 0.24 0.36 -0.45 -0.18 -0.05 -0.15
d9-d10 1.1 0.99 0.25 0.39 -0.38 -0.15 -0.044 -0.14
Note: “Level” represents variations in level terms (e), while “%” represents variations in relative
terms, using the value in the absence of feebate as a reference. Variations in level terms are in
mg/km for emissions of NOX, CO and HC and mg/10 km for PM.
Figure 7: Variation in the diesel share and initial diesel share
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(a) In percentage terms
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(b) In percentage points terms
Note: Local polynomial regressions using second-order polynomials.
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feebate, while the second weights are proportional to the estimated municipality average air
emissions concentrations.
Table 31: Description of the objective functions and outcomes of interest
Outcome Objective Function
CS Simple average maxλj
∑
m φmCSm (λ1, ..., λJ)





CSm (λ1, ..., λJ)
CS Min maxλj minmCSm (λ1, ..., λJ)
CS Range minλj (maxmCSm(λ1, ..., λJ)−minmCSm(λ1, ..., λJ))
French profits Simple average maxλj
∑
f Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)





Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)
French profits Min maxλj minf Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)
French profits Range minλj (maxf Πf (λ1, ..., λJ)−minf Πf (λ1, ..., λJ))
Pollutant Simple average minλj
∑
m φmηm(λ1, ..., λJ).










Pollutant Max minλj maxm ηm(λ1, ..., λJ)
Pollutant Range minλj (maxm ηm(λ1, ..., λJ)−minm ηm(λ1, ..., λJ))
%Diesel Simple average minλj
∑
m φmdm(λ1, ..., λJ)
%Diesel Weighted average minλj
∑
m φmd̄mdm(λ1, ..., λJ)
%Diesel Max minλj maxm dm(λ1, ..., λJ)
%Diesel Range minλj (maxm dm(λ1, ..., λJ)−minm dm(λ1, ..., λJ))
Note: “CS” stands for consumer surplus. The consumer surplus weights are inversely proportional to the income Im.
The profit weights are inversely proportional to the market share of the car manufacturer sf . Emission weights η̃
1
m are
proportional to the average emissions in 2008 with the feebate. Emission weights η̃2m are proportional to the average air
emissions concentrations. Diesel weights are proportional to the share of diesel in 2008 with the feebate d̄m.
The computation of the parameters of each feebate scheme requires solving a system of
966 non-linear equations (964 car prices plus the two feebate parameters). I reduce the
computation time by improving several aspects. First, I rely on relevant initial values for
the feebate parameters. These initial values are the solutions to a simplified problem that
assumes that car manufacturers do not modify their prices and entirely pass through the
feebate to consumers. To solve this simplified problem, I also start from relevant initial
values, which are the solutions obtained for the representative sample of 3,000 municipalities.
Finally, instead of performing a non-linear optimization over the 966 parameters, I use a
nested algorithm. I optimize over the two feebate parameters only while solving the optimal
prices inside the objective function using an iterative algorithm. This approach improves
the computation time relative to performing the optimization over the prices and feebate
parameters. I solve for 128 feebate schemes between 89 and 216 g/km with an increment of
one g/km.17 I check the robustness of the results to the use of a finer grid on the representative
sample of 3,000 municipalities. The results are displayed in Table 32 below. I do not find
systematically larger potential gains with the finer grid, which assures me that the grid used
is not too coarse.
17For the second feebate class, the grid is [105, 214] g/km because I cannot find solutions for pivot points
outside of this range.
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Table 32: Potential gains from the optimal linear feebates (in % of the optimal outcomes)
for the sample of 3,000 municipalities
Objective Feebate Simple Weighted Weighted Min Range
Outcome scheme average average (1) average (2) or max Max - Min
CS (1) 0.034 0.02 0.174 3.68
(146/19/21) (143/17/25) (127.6/10/75) (89/8/23,798)
(2) -0.322 -0.546 -0.397 4.52
(158.4/33/37) (156.4/30/40) (140.4/15/87) (105/12/26,145)
(3) -0.012 -0.093 0.106 3.83
(147.2/12/31) (145/11/35) (131.2/6/83) (89/5/47,722)
Fr. Profits (1) 0.505 0.244 0.303 12.39
(119/7/262) (147.6/20/19) (89/8/23,798)
(2) -0.214 -0.716 -0.658 11.98
(112/7/1229) (188/135/15) (201/305/10) (105/12/26,145)
(3) 0.266 -0.077 0.102 13.09
(119/4/320) (160/20/18) (89/5/47,722)
NOX (1) 2.69 2.67 3.07 0.789 21.7
(114.4/7/550) (114.6/7/532) (114.2/7/568) (89/8/23,798)
(2) 4.49 4.34 5.11 1.19 -4.385
(149.4/22/55) (111.6/7/1,388) (111.4/7/1,483) (143.4/17/74) (135/12/116)
(3) 4.32 4.2 4.88 1.25 19.97
(113/4/877) (89/5/47,722)
PM (1) 3.55 3.55 3.63 0.995 36.03
(115/7/499) (89/8/23,798)
(2) 5.61 5.58 5.72 1.29 -4.638
(110.8/7/1,859) (111/7/1,716) (111.4/7/1,483) (213.4/923/8)
(3) 5.25 5.18 5.29 1.39 33.79
(113/4/877) (89/5/47,722)
CO (1) 0.805 0.921 0.754 9.71 22.7
(89/8/23,798)
(2) -2.071 -1.769 -1.519 -2.579 -4.341
(108/13/6,489) (213.4/923/8) (139/14/94)
(3) -0.07 0.119 -0.007 8.72 21.04
(104.2/6/2,863) (104/6/2,901) (104.4/6/2,826) (89/5/47,722)
HC (1) 0.858 0.946 0.836 9.29 28.33
(89/8/23798)
(2) 0.25 0.222 0.077 13.72 46.13
(105/12/26,145)
(3) 0.137 0.283 0.196 8.41 26.38
(106.8/6/2,443) (105.6/6/2,622) (107.6/6/2,335) (89/5/47,722)
%Diesel (1) 3.07 3.02 0.902 22.75
(114.4/7/550) (114.6/7/532) (114.2/7/568) (89/8/23,798)
(2) 5.36 5.09 1.36 -4.019
(150.4/23/52) (148.2/21/58) (143.2/16/75) (130/10/157)
(3) 5.01 4.82 1.44 20.96
(113/4/877) (89/5/47,722)
Note: Weights are inversely proportional to income for consumer surplus, inversely proportional to market share
for manufacturers’ profits, proportional to average emissions for the pollutants and proportional to the diesel share
for the diesel share reduction objective.“Min/Max” represents the minimum surplus and manufacturer profits and
the maximum average emissions levels and diesel share. Values in parentheses are the parameters of the optimal
feebate scheme and are, in order: pivot point/tax rate/rebate rate. The grid search was conducted over 633 pivot
points between 89 and 215.4 g/km for the feebate scheme classes (1) and (3) and over 544 pivot points between 105
and 213.6 g/km for the feebate scheme (2); with an increment of 0.2 g/km.
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